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ABSTRACT
There exists broad consensus in political science that the rule of law
is as essential to a consolidated modern democracy as electoral politics
or a robust civil society. Paradoxically, however, the rule of law as an
institution has not been subjected to nearly the same rigorous study as
those other popular variables. Although frequently used, the term is
rarely defined. Political scientists declare the general importance of the
rule of law, but reduce their focus to the "rules of the game" for
political elites and the adoption of select laws and judicial institutions.
Frequently, an instrumentalist metaphor is deployed: the law is a sword,
or shield, or tool to advance democratic ends, by which the law's utility
can be measured.
This Article presents two related arguments against such approaches
to the study of the rule of law in Russia. First, predictions about Russian
democracy will be more prone to error if specialists on Russia urge the
development of the rule of law but limit themselves to cramped
understandings of the full parameters of this institution. Second,
instrumentalist metaphors of the rule of law hinder our understanding
of the importance of the rule of law for a would-be democracy like
Russia. The rule of law is better understood there not as an instrument
wielded by or against the state, but as a causeway. The primary value of
this causeway stems from the security its existence provides citizens to
move freely among state and non-state institutions in daily life, com-
merce, and politics.
Exactly what sort of an institution is the rule of law? What is the
extent of its value in a teetering electoral democracy like Russia? How
can its existence - let alone its efficacy - be measured in such a state?
These are the questions addressed in this Article from theoretical,
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the climax of Robert Bolt's play, A Man For All Seasons, Cromwell
plays the part of prosecutor at the show trial of Sir Thomas More. "I put
it to the Court," Cromwell says, "that the prisoner is perverting the law -
making smoky what should be a clear light to discover to the Court his
own wrongdoing!" To this attack, More stoically replies, "The law is not
a 'light' for you or any man to see by; the law is not an instrument of any
kind. The law is a causeway upon which, so long as he keeps to it, a
citizen may walk safely."1
Citizens do not walk safely in the Russian Federation. From the most
basic transactions of daily life to the most complex commercial affairs,
all are subject to arbitrary and capricious interference by the state.
Corruption is widespread.2 The courts are widely mistrusted to resolve
either the legal disputes that arise between private citizens or to remedy
1. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FORALL SEASONS, ActII 152-53 (Random House 1962).
2. See, e.g., Stephen Sestanovich, Russian Democracy in Eclipse: Force, Money, and Pluralism, J.
DEMOCRACY, July 2004, at 33. An anti-corruption campaign took pride of place in President
Vladimir Putin's State-of-the-Nation Address on April 25, 2005. SeePutin Focuses on Domestic Policy in
State-of-Nation Address to Russian Parliament, BBC MONrrORING INTERNATIONAL REPORTS, Apr. 25,
2005 ("Our bureaucracy remains a closed and sometimes simply arrogant caste which sees state
service as a kind of business.... Our plans do not include handing the country over to inefficient
and corrupt bureaucrats.").
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the wrongs a citizen may suffer at the hands of state officials.3 If the
citizen should seek a political solution to this insecurity, whether
through grassroots activism or periodic electoral campaigns, he sub-
jects himself to the state's wide array of what has euphemistically been
gathered under the heading "administrative resources," i.e. a canting
political playing field of KoAnpaMam [kompromat - blackmail], increas-
ingly restrictive election laws, structural fraud, and occasional vio-
lence.4 Whether private individuals or public dissidents, oligarchs or
CU.oGUKU [siloviki - military or security services], citizens of the Russian
Federation lack the ability to plot a course in private life, business, or
politics that, so long as they keep to it, will secure their legal rights and
protect them from loss, seizure, or arrest. Such a state of affairs is, to
put it mildly, a problem for a would-be consolidated democracy.
Bolt's metaphor of the rule of law as a causeway presents in a nutshell
the argument I advance in this Article. This Article is about the value of
the rule of law as an institution in a country that asserts - in the first
clause of the first article of the first chapter of the first section of its
constitution - to be a democratic, federal, rule-of-law state.5 Last
month, President Putin unabashedly insisted that such a statement is
not merely aspirational. And yet, experts on Russian politics spare
surprisingly little attention to the questions that Russia's constitutional
3. Robert Coalson, Vast Majority of Russians Have No Faith in Judicial Independence, RFE/RL
NEWSLINE,Jun. 3, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/06/030605.asp (Poll of 1600 respon-
dents, conducted prior to the conviction of Yukos executives Khodorkovskii and Lebedev,
indicating that 69.8% of respondents fear becoming victims of corruption in law enforcement
agencies, and believe that the state "constantly" (nearly 36% of respondents) or "frequently"
(13.9%) uses the courts or police for political ends.). See also Richard Rose, Neil Munro & William
Mishler, Resigned Acceptance of An Incomplete Democracy: Russia's Political Equilibrium, 20 POST-SovIET
AFF. 195, 200 (2004) (91% of respondents to 2004 nationwide survey of face-to-face interviews
believe state officials selectively enforce the law and 84% believe bribe-takers go unpunished).
4. Two instructive examples, out of many, are the quixotic fate of Aleksandr Arinin's
campaign for president in the republic of Bashkortostan in spring 1998 and the violent death of
Yabloko activist and journalist Larisa Yudina in Kalmykia on 8June 1998. For interviews with both
activists and brief summaries of their fates, see JEFFREY KAHN, FEDERALISM, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND
THE RuLE OF LAW IN RussIA, 214-20, 231-33 (2002).
5. KONSTITLSIA ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [Constitution] §1, Ch. 1, art. 1, cl. 1 (Russian
Federation) ("PoccncKa, (IegepaiM - PoccwA ecm' gemoKpaTHqecKoe 4begepaTIsnHoe npaBoaoe
rocygapcTBo C pecny6nHKacKofl (bopMori npanneHnA.") ("The Russian Federation - Russia is a
democratic federative law-governed state with a republican form of government.").
6. For Putin's view, see 60 Minutes: President Putin (CBS television broadcast May 9, 2005),
available at http://kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/05/09/0842-type82916_87807.shtml.
Of course, Russia is a democracy. This is a state that has freed itself from the situation
where it was for 80 years when one political force dominated the scene and had a
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and presidential assurances must provoke: Exactly what kind of institu-
tion is the rule of law? What is the extent of its value in a teetering
Russian democracy? How can we measure the existence (let alone the
efficacy) of the rule of law in such a state?7 This is despite the increasing
importance of law in Russian life and a broad consensus in political
science that the rule of law is essential to a consolidated modem
democracy.8
The choice between these two metaphors - between law as a tool and
law as a causeway - is, and has always been, a crucial one for Russia's
monopoly on power in the country. There is no doubt that Russia has entered a
completely different stage.
It goes without saying that the development of democratic institutions in this
country is at an early stage. But they are growing stronger and asserting themselves. The
people have not just chosen democracy. There is no doubt that the main democratic
institutions are already in place. Even the mentality of our society has become
democratic.
We have a multi-party system. It is still weak and requires consolidation but this is
an absolute fact. We conduct very important democratic law-based elections to a
representative body of government, the parliament. The head of state, who is entitled to
be in power for no more than two four-year terms in succession, is democratically
elected as well.
Our judicial system is making headway, even though there have been some
problems. I'd like to point out that we have an independent legal system.
We haven't just created conditions but achieved a real division of power between
the executive, legislative (representative) and judicial bodies of government. This fact,
as well as the mass media, and the development of democratic institutions and a civil
society, are the main indications of the Russian Federation's democratic development.
Therefore, it is beyond any doubt that Russia is a democratic state. Id.
7. I adopt Rawls' broad definition of an institution:
[A] public system of rules which defines offices and positions with their rights and
duties, powers and immunities, and the like. These rules specify certain forms of action
as permissible, others as forbidden; and they provide for certain penalties and defenses,
and so on, when violations occur. As examples of institutions, or more generally social
practices, we may think of games and rituals, trials and parliaments, markets and
systems of property. An institution may be thought of in two ways: first as an abstract
object, that is, as a possible form of conduct expressed by a system of rules; and second,
as the realization in the thought and conduct of certain persons at a certain time and
place of the actions specified by these rules.
JOHN RAwLs, A THEoRY OFJUSTICE § 10, at 47-48 (revised ed. 1999).
8. See, e.g., Valerie Bunce, Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations, 33
COMP. POL. STUD. 703, 714 (2000) ("Without rule of law, democracy cannot be fully realized.");
Thomas Carothers, The Rule of Law Revival 77 FOREIGN AFF. 95, 99 (Mar./Apr. 1998) ("In many
countries, people still argue over the appropriateness of various models of democracy or
capitalism. But hardly anyone these days will admit to being against the idea of law.").
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political development. History shows that, with few exceptions, Russia's
leaders have chosen the former, instrumentalist metaphor. Russian
even provides a proverb, still in use today, for this understanding of law
as a tool: "3aKoH KaK abU4AOo - KyOa noepny., myaa U uGbZa0" [zakon kak
dyshlo - kuda povernul, tuda i vyshlo: The law is like the shaft of a wagon; it
goes wherever you turn it.] .9
Experts on Russian politics are also surprisingly unreflective in their
use of this metaphor in advocating the rule-of-law course that Russia
should pursue today. One respected American scholar, for example,
urges that "[tio build a state that abides by the rule of law, individual
Russian judges, lawyers, and citizens must adopt a fundamentally new
relationship with the law and make it a tool of defense that emanates
from society rather than an instrument of control in the hands of the
state."1 For this scholar and for many others, the only metaphor is law
as a tool, whereby the value of law depends upon who wields the tool
and for what purpose.11 This instrumentalist metaphor typically takes
the form of either sword or shield - or the shaft of a wagon - wielded by
or turned against the state.
12
Metaphors matter because they frame the way we think about
problems. The metaphor of law as a tool is the wrong one to use when
arguing for the sort of rule of law needed for a consolidated Russian
democracy. It is uncontentious today to critique the use of law as a
political tool in Imperial Russia, during the Bolsheviks' consolidation
of their power, or in an increasingly ossified and stagnant Soviet system.
An instrumentalist conception of law is even less appropriate to de-
9. See, e.g., Vyacheslav Kostikov, "Dva Putina, dve strany," ARGUMENTY i FAKTY, Feb. 9, 2005,
available at http://www.aif.ru/online/aif/1267/04_01 (the article replaces 3aao [zakon - statute]
with cyO [sud- court], but without meaningful difference).
10. MICHAEL MCFAUL, RussiA's UNFINISHED REVOLUTION: PoLrrICAL CHANGE FROM GORBACHEV
TO PTIN 328 (2001).
11. See, e.g.,Jos6 Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski, Introduction to DEMOCRACY AND THE RuLE
OF LAw 3, 15 (Jos6 Maria Maravall & Adam Przeworski, eds., 2003) ("When power is monopolized,
the law is at most an instrument of the rule of someone. Only if conflicting political actors seek to
resolve their conflicts by recourse to law, does law rule.... Rule of law can prevail only when the
relation of political forces is such that those who are most powerful find that the law is on their side
or, to put it conversely, when law is the preferred tool of the powerful.... The conflict between
rule of majority and rule of law is just a conflict between actors who use votes and laws as their
instruments.").
12. HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRAnMON 38-39 (1983) (arguing that the concept of law transcendent over politics and distinct
from the state's powers has been substantially weakened in the twentieth century and replaced
with a view of law as an instrument of the state, which Berman characterizes as a significant threat
to the Westeru legal tradition).
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scribe the institutions and practices that are critically important to an
aspiring post-Soviet Russian democracy, all the more so when the
understanding of law as a tool is nearly ubiquitous among Russia's
current leaders and wealthiest private citizens. For a Russian state of
limited economic resources, severe institutional and attitudinal con-
straints, and a political legacy of authoritarianism, it is the rule of law
envisioned in the metaphor of a causeway - and not in the metaphors
of weaponry - that reformers should strive to achieve. In this Article, I
briefly trace this history to highlight the consequences of legal instru-
mentalism in Russia's political past and to present the argument for the
better metaphor of the causeway for the rule of law that Russia needs in
its first forays into democratic governance.
II. THE RULE OF LAW
There is broad consensus in political science that the rule of law is as
integral to effectively functioning modern democratic systems as elec-
toral politics and a robust civil society.1 3 Paradoxically, however, the
concept has not been subjected to the same rigorous study as those
other, more popular political science variables. When political scien-
tists and policy-makers promote the development of the rule of law in
Russia, their analysis of this institution is frequently too reductionist.
Analysts typically limit their interest in the rule of law to its effect on
elites negotiating the "rules of the game" in electoral contests over
control of the upper echelons of political institutions. This reduction-
ism also manifests itself in another way: the willingness to proclaim the
existence of the rule of law merely on the positivist evidence of the
adoption of new laws and codes and judicial institutions alone. But the
rule of law is not the sort of institution that can be established by
putting pen to paper or setting bricks on mortar. That has been a
painful, and painfully expensive, lesson for Russian would-be reformers
13. See, e.g., Bunce, supra note 8; Carothers, supra note 8, at 95 ("One cannot get through a
foreign policy debate these days without someone proposing the rule of law as a solution to the
world's troubles."); JUAN J. LiNz & ALFRE STEPAN, PROBLEMS OF DEMOCRATIC TRANsmON AND
CONSOLIDATION: SOUTHERN EUROPE, SOUTH AMERICA, AND POST-COMMUNIST EUROPE 10 (1996) ("To
achieve a consolidated democracy, the necessary degree of autonomy and independence of civil
and political society must further be imbedded in and supported by the rule of law.... .");JOSEPH
STiGLrrz, GLORAIUZATION AND ITs DISCONTENTS 139 (2003) (noting importance of legal institutions
to a market economy, from enforcement of contracts and shareholder rights to orderly bank-
ruptcy procedures to bank and securities regulation);Francis Fukuyama, The Art of Reconstruction,
WALL ST. J., July 28, 2004, at A12 (emphasizing the "new consensus" on the importance of rule of
law as an institution).
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and an international community of legal aid donors to learn. 14
Area-studies specialists and comparativists alike frequently use the
term 'rule of law' without seriously attempting to define it.15 Although
everyone agrees that the rule of law is important, its existence in a polity
is a question that tends to be answered the way U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Potter Stewart once defined pornography: "I know it when I see
it.''16 When definitions are offered, they are often unhelpfully conclu-
sory and imprecise.17 A frequent tendency is to focus exclusively on the
problems of drafting a viable constitutional structure, with the tacit
expectation that the rule of law will trickle down from the institutions
of high politics.'i An emphasis on constitutionalism leads to undue
14. Carothers, supra note 8 at 104 (critiquing legal aid donors of model codes and training
courses that produce only "modest" results, especially in Russia, "probably the single largest
recipient of such aid.... [and] not even clearly moving in the right direction."). See also Richard
A. Posner, Creating a Legal Framework for Economic Development, 13 WORLD BAK Ras. OBSERVER 1, 3
(Feb. 1998) (advocating "the prudent choice .... to defer legal projects that are costly and
ambitious and instead to begin modestly," noting "the risk that too heavy an initial investment in
legal reform could deprive the productive economy of necessary resources and thus stifle legal
and economic reforms....").
15. See, e.g.,Vladimir Gel'man, Regime Transition, Uncertainty and Prospects for Democratisation:
The Politics of Russia's Regions in a Comparative Perspective, 51 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 939, 939-956
(1999); JOHN LOWENHARDT, THE REINCARNATION OF RUSSIA 26-28 (1995); LLIA SHEVrSOVA, PuTiN'S
RUSSIA 65-66, 258-59 (2003); Gordon B. Smith, Russia and the Rule of Law, in DEVELOPMENTS IN
RUSSIAN POLITICS 5 108 (Stephen White et al. eds. 2001); M. Steven Fish, The Travails of LiberalismJ.
DEMOCRACY, Apr. 1996, at 105, 113-15 (advocating a "rights-based liberalism" for Russia without
any reference to the rule-of-law mechanisms essential for such a project).
16. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart,J., concurring).
17. Even one of the better working definitions, by Linz and Stepan, overemphasizes the high
politics of constitutionalism and underemphasizes the equally important role of an everyday legal
culture, non-governmental legal institutions, and the self-binding commitment of the state vis-A-vis
citizens (and not just as against its organized political opponents). See LINz & STEPAN, supra note
13, at 10. Linz and Stepan refer to constitutionalism as the "primary organizing principle" of their
rule-of-law arena and the focus of their concern is almost exclusively on the self-binding
constraints of politicians. Id. at 248, esp. n.31. In a previous incarnation of this seminal work, the
authors use the broader term "rule of law" interchangeably with the narrower term "Rechstaat,"
although it seems unlikely that the authors really intended to limit themselves to the formalistic,
positivist implications of the German term. SeeJuan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated
Democracies,J. DEMOCRACY, April 1996, at 14-33.
18. SHEVrSOVA, supra note 15, at 259 ("A transition to the rule of law meant that the regime
trusted society, giving it the chance to truly participate in government, and was relying not on
behind-the-scenes pacts, force, and fear, but on the law and on independent institutions. Without
a strategy of participation for society, millions of people could not consciously participate in the
restoration of Russia, and the modernization of which the president spoke could not take place.").
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focus on legal formalism and positivism.1 9 Other scholars briefly ac-
knowledge the problems of developing a legal culture, but then turn
their focus to more tangible topics like lawmaking and election-
monitoring.20 Thus, one scholar asserts that the rule of law requires
only the passage of legislation and the funding of institutions for the
laws' enforcement. 21 Still others use "rule of law" simply as a general
placeholder to express their criticism of ad hoc, non-transparent, cor-
rupt, or other unsavory types of state action.
This tendency toward reductionism inhibits our study of Russia
because the rule of law is a rich and multi-faceted concept that
encompasses far more than electoralism, constitutionalism, or codifica-
tion. The rule of law extends far beyond the institutions required for
elites to negotiate the functioning of high politics. In addition to state
institutions (such as a legislature, judiciary, or organs of law enforce-
ment) the rule of law also requires a variety of non-state institutions:
organized legal education, a professional bar, and a myriad of support-
ing professions (accountants, investigators, etc.) and organizations
(newspapers, public registries, credit bureaus, etc.). The rule of law
affects the development of mass attitudes and commercial behavior. It
imbeds itself in a country's political culture and in its civil society. It
entrenches expectations about the role and limits of a state bureau-
cracy, and the limits of commercial freedom and individual action.22
Finally, but most importantly, the rule of law requires some level of
shared expectations by political elites, lawyers, and laypersons about
what counts as law, about what are the limits of judicial power, and
about into what spheres of life the law may not be permitted to intrude.
The institutional strength of the rule of law, although difficult to
measure, is best expressed on a continuum.23 Thus, when observers of
Russia's transition from authoritarianism urge the development of the
19. See, e.g., Robert Barros, Dictatorship and the Rule of Law: Rules and Military Power in Pinochet's
Chile, in MARAVALL & PRzEWORSEi, supra note 11, at 190-93.
20. In a surprisingly ahistorical claim that the rule of law "rests significantly on democratic
institutions and processes," Neil MacFarlane limits his essentially positivist definition of the term
with the caveat of judicial independence. S. Neil MacFarlane, Politics and the Rule of Law in the
Commonwealth of Independent States, in LAw AND INFoRMAL PRAcTcEs 61, 63-66 (DenisJ. Galligan &
Marina Kurkchiyan eds., 2003).
21. Smith, supra note 15, at 112.
22. Civil society, political society, economic society and a usable state bureaucracy are all
areas that are considered essential to a consolidated democracy. See LINZ & STEPAN, supra note 13,
at 7.
23. See, e.g., KATHRvN HENDLEY, TRYING TO MAKE LAW MATrER: LEGAL REFORM AND LABOR LAw
IN THE SOVIET UNION 12 (1996) (adopting a rule-of-law continuum between positivism andjudicial
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rule of law, but limit themselves to cramped understandings of its
meaning or accept Austinian positivism as sufficient evidence that it has
taken root, they are bound to be disappointed in their expectations,
and their predictions for Russian democracy are prone to error.
Why are political scientists apparently comfortable calculating elec-
toral thresholds for parliamentary party lists, or comparing advantages
of presidential versus parliamentary systems, or parsing the criteria for
robust civil societies, economic systems and multinational federations,
but tend to shy away from defining the parameters for the rule-of-law
variable?2 4 Political scientists seem to prefer to assign that task - when it
is even acknowledged - to the lawyers.25 This is an artificial academic
divide with a long history but little utility. Thirty-five years ago, Dank-
wart Rustow noted, "Our current emphasis in political science on
economic and social factors is a most necessary corrective to the sterile
legalism of an earlier generation" and warned that " [w] e have been in
danger of throwing away the political baby with the institutional
bathwater."26 This sharp division of disciplines and consequent exclu-
review for constitutionally entrenched rights). See also Stephen Holmes, Lineages of the Rule of Law,
in Maravall & Przeworski, supra note 11, at 49.
24. See, e.g., Guillermo O'Donnell, Illusions About Consolidation, J. DEMOCRACY, April 1996, at
34, 36 (Referring to Robert Dahl's definition of polyarchy, "the definition of polyarchy is silent
about important but elusive themes such as if, how, and to what degree governments are
responsive or accountable to citizens between elections, and the degree to which the rule of law
extends over the country's geographic and social terrain. These silences are appropriate: the
definition of polyarchy, let us recall, establishes a crucial cut off point - one that separates cases
where there exist inclusive, fair, and competitive elections and basic accompanying freedoms
from all others, including not only unabashed authoritarian regimes but also countries that hold
elections but lack some of the characteristics thatjointly define polyarchy.").
25. The lawyers, on the other hand, lack the perspective and skills that make the contribution
of political scientists and Russian specialists to this question so valuable.
A man who has had legal training is never quite the same again ... is never able to look
at institutions or administrative practices or even social or political policies, free from
his legal habits or beliefs. It is not easy for a lawyer to become a political scientist. It is
very difficult for him to become a sociologist or a historian .... He is interested in
relationships, in rights in something or against somebody, in relation to others ....
This is what is meant by the legalistic approach.
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, LEGALISM: LAw, MORALS, AND POLIICAL TRIALS 9 (1964) (ellipses in citation)
(quoting J.A.G. Griffiths, The Law of Property, in LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY 117-19 (Morris Ginsburg, ed., 1959)).
26. Dankwart A. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Mode4 2 COMP. POL. 337,
343-44 (1970). Likewise, even Lord Dicey was not immune from these turf battles, asserting that
certain subjects of parliamentary procedure and convention were "not one of law but of politics,
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sion of subjects has had a negative effect on our ability to explore the
parameters and problems of such a crucial institution.
Admittedly, defining the full scope of the term "the rule of law" is not
easy. Professor William Butler observed that the phrase was first devised
by A.V. Dicey in his magisterial treatise, Introduction to the Study of the
Law of the Constitution, and that the phrase was first introduced into
Russia by a 19th century Russian translation of this work.27 That is not
to say that Dicey invented the idea; Dicey himself observed that the
principles behind the concept owed their establishment to the "labours
of lawyers" from the earliest times of medieval England. Successive
legal scholars have debated its theoretical foundations from every
vantage point.29 It is not my intent, nor is it possible within the
constraints of this Article, to provide an exhaustive treatment of the
term. And the choices I have made below in selecting my criteria could
easily be expanded or narrowed based on any number ofjurispruden-
tial predispositions. I do not pretend to have offered the final word or
even to have adequately defended the laundry list I have propounded.
and need trouble no lawyer or the class of any professor of law." AN. Dicey, INTRODUCTION TO THE
STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 31 (10th ed. 1959). See, e.g., Geoffrey Marshall The Analysis
of British Political Institutions in THE BRrnsH STUDY OF POLrITCS IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 258 (Jack
Hayward, Brian Barry, & Archie Brown eds., 1999) ("If we imagine a late twentieth-century
political scientist transposed to the first decade of the century and ask in what direction he might
have looked for assistance in analyzing the nature of British political institutions, we should find
him turning not only to the historians and journalists but to the works of the lawyers, in particular
that ofAlbert Venn Dicey, Frederick Maitland and Sir William Anson.").
27. William E. Butler, Jus and Lex in Russian Law: A Discussion Agenda, in LAW AND INFORMAL
PRACTICES, supra note 20, at 47, 48. Professor Bernard Rudden, however, notes that the phrase "the
government of law" appears in Adam Ferguson's essay "On the History of Civil Society," published
in 1767. See Bernard Rudden, Civil Society and Civil Law, in THE REVIVAL OF PRIVATE LAw IN CENTRAL
AND EASTERN EUROPE: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF FJ.M. FELDBRUGGE 17 (George Ginsburgs, Donald D.
Barry & William B. Simons, eds., 1996). This was the year that Semon Efimovich Desnitskii, the
"father of Russian jurisprndence," returned to Moscow from his six years at Glasgow University,
where he studied law underJohn Millar and Adam Smith. See A.H. Brown, The Father of Russian
Jurisprudence: The Legal Thought of S.E. Desnitskii, in RUSSIAN LAw: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL
PERSPECTIVES 117,118-20 (William E. Butler ed., 1977).
28. Dicey, supra note 26, at vi. The first manifestation of the idea was revolutionary, an
unprecedented act of self-restraint by the 12th-century kings of England (who, prior to that time,
were responsible only to the god under whose authority they claimed power). The monarch
assented to bind his ministers and officers to act under laws, interpreted by royal courts, to which
the citizen could appeal under law (in stark contrast to the tradition of personal appeals to
another patron) against abuses of power by those who acted in the name of the crown.
29. See generally, H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); RAWLS, supra note 7; Geoffrey
Marshall, The Analysis of British Political Institutions, in THE BRITISH STUDY OF POLITICS IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 26, at 276-278.
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Rather, my objective is to expose the depth of meaning that "the rule of
law" encompasses and the problems the phrase presents to political
scientists, lawyers, and Russian area-studies specialists interested in
observing the breadth of rule-of-law issues in Russia. Following Dicey, I
think that the term is of most use to comparativists and Russian
area-studies specialists if it is stated as a set of general principles rather
than as a list of specific institutional or legislative requirements. 30 I
offer three such principles as a starting point.
1
A. Three Principles
Two caveats are necessary before introducing these three principles.
First, all three principles reinforce one essential meaning of the rule of
law. Nearly all scholars agree that the rule of law means the supremacy
of law over government, or put another way, government under law. 2
The law is binding on the state itself, which remains constrained by it
until the law is repealed or changed by some later properly promul-
gated law.33 This subordination was justified historically, but with
increasing controversy, with the "belief in the existence of a body of law
beyond the law of the highest political authority."34 The continuing
jurisprudential debate over what this normative belief in a higher law
30. This is also in keeping with the practice of lexicographers, too. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1332 (6th ed. 1991) ("A legal principle, of general application, sanctioned by the
recognition of authorities, and usually expressed in the form of a maxim or logical proposition.
Called a 'rule,' because in doubtful or unforeseen cases it is a guide or norm for their decision.
The rule of law, sometimes called 'the supremacy of law,' provides that decisions should be made
by the application of known principles or laws without the intervention of discretion in their
application.").
31. Dicey argued that the rule of law encapsulated "under one expression at least three
distinct though kindred conceptions." Dicey, supra note 26, at 188. Other scholars, notablyJohn
Rawls, have ascribed certain principles or precepts to the term that can either be located within
Dicey's formulation or that broadly track it. See RAwLS, supra note 7, at § 38. Although easily
recognizable within Dicey's formulation, my own exposition of the necessary elements of the rule
of law do not exactly correspond to his.
32. Dicey, supra note 26, at 187. But see Maravall & Przeworski, supra note 11, at 15 ("Rule of
law isjust one possible outcome of situations in which political actors process their conflicts, using
whatever resources they can muster. When law rules, it is not because it antecedes political actions.
We wrote this book because we believe that law cannot be separated from politics.").
33. BERMAN, supra note 12, at 9 ("The monarch, it is argued, may make law, but he may not
make it arbitrarily, and until he has remade it - lawfully - he is bound by it.").
34. Id., at 45. For a strongly argued Machiavellian critique of this view, see Maravall &
Przeworski, supra note 11, at 1 ("The normative conception of the rule of law is a figment of the
imagination of jurists. It is implausible as a description. Moreover, it is incomplete as an
explanation.").
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might be (e.g. common law, divine law, natural law, universal human
rights) should not distract us. It has little guidance to offer the three
principles I will examine.
The crucial distinction to make, and the second caveat to these three
principles, is that the "rule of law" is not synonymous with "rule by law"
or "rule through laws." These latter phrases describe a political system in
which statutes and other legislation are the supreme authority in the
state by virtue of adherence to a formal legislative process of passing
statutes and other legal acts. Such a system is commonly called a
Rechtsstaat, and that is not what I mean by a rule-of-law state in which
government operates under law. In a Rechtsstaat, the state merely
subordinates itself to its own rules, which it can change in accordance
with the same procedures; in other words, the state is subject to no
subordination at all. Such a positivist approach to law is an insufficient
guarantee of the procedural and substantive requirements of the rule
of law that are explored below. 5 The concept of rule of law envisions a
system in which the state is not the sole source of law and adherence to
procedural formality is necessary but not sufficient for law to be made.
The self-binding notion of government under law does not create a
Rechtsstaat, not rule through laws, but a much deeper and broader set
of constraints on state power.
These constraints can be identified in the following three principles,
essential to (if not exclusive to or exhaustive of) the meaning bound up
in the phrase "the rule of law." They are worth exploration by political
scientists and Russian specialists who use the term as one of many
criteria to assess Russian democracy. I will return to them repeatedly in
this Article.
First, the rule of law, or supremacy of law over government, means that
there can be no offense - criminal, civil, political or administrative -
without law. This concept has an ancient formulation: nullem crimen sine
lege. As Dicey expressed it, "no man is punishable or can be lawfully
made to suffer in body or goods except for a distinct breach of law
established in the ordinary legal manner before the ordinary courts of
the land."36 There is a lot packed into this phrase, including an implicit
35. Similarly, many scholars equate the rule of law with constitutionalism. But there exist
plenty of examples (e.g. the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, apartheid South Africa) to demonstrate
that such a formalistic Rechtsstaat can easily fail to satisfy the other (some would say, normative)
criteria of the rule of law discussed below. See HaroldJ. Berman, The Rule of Law and the Law-Based
State (Rechtsstaaot), in TowARD THE RULE OF LAW IN RusSIA?: POLIrICAL AND LEGAL REFORM IN THE
TRANSITION PERIOD 43, 49 (Donald D. Barry, ed. 1992).
36. Dicey, supra note 26, at 188. See also RAWLs, supra note 7, at 209-10.
[Vol. 37
RULE OF LAW IN RUSSIA
notion of what is law. Without diving deep into philosophy, our
purposes are met by a few generally accepted expectations. First,
although stated in the negative, the phrase "no offense without law" has
an enormous positive component: unless the law prohibits an action,
that action is permissible. No offense without law thus implies that the
law must be publicly accessible, knowable by those whom it would
constrain, to afford a sense of predictability or legal certainty. The law
must be stated in general terms. And it must not be retroactive in its
application.
A second principle must be that the first principle is universalized: all
law applies equally to all citizens. Political elites in the executive and
the legislative branches do not enjoy the prerogative to choose when
the law applies, or to whom, a feature common to authoritarian
regimes.3 7 The principle therefore requires that the judiciary treat
similar cases similarly, a principle of equality that promotes not just a
certain predictability about legal judgments, but a formal equality of
arms between legal combatants regardless of wealth, military rank, or
political office that would otherwise immunize against judicial pro-
cess.3 8 It may even imply ajudicial mechanism to protect, or at least to
give voice to, discrete and insular minorities at risk of permanent
political exclusion by entrenched majorities.39
These two principles imply a third principle: the capacity for enforce-
37. This aspect of the rule of law has a long lineage. See, e.g., Lord Coke, PROHIBITIONS DEL
RoY (1607), reprinted in 77 THE ENGLISH REPORTS KING'S BENCH DIVSION 1342, 1342 (Max. A.
Robertson & Geoffrey Ellis eds. 1979) (1607), in which Lord Coke, then ChiefJustice in the Court
of Common Pleas, found himself in sharp conflict with both the Archbishop of Canterbury and
James I. The issue was whether the king as chief justice of England could select cases out of his
courts for his own decision, on the theory that hisjudges exercised discretionary powers granted
by the Crown and just as easily revoked. Coke's answer was that such an act would not be ajudicial
act, but an exercise in legislative or executive power.
38. Dicey, supra note 26, at 193 ("[N]o man is above the law.., every man, whatever be his
rank or condition, is subject to the ordinary law of the realm and amenable to the jurisdiction of
the ordinary tribunals."). See also RAWLS, supra note 7, at 208-09. This last point is perhaps the most
susceptible to variation. Most Western democracies permit themselves some form of sovereign
immunity from suit against the state and qualified immunity for certain suits against their officials.
However, with the growth of the administrative state, the citizen's ability to demand equitable
relief, if not money damages, against the state and its agents has generally kept pace with this
rule-of-law concept.
39. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (famously
raising, without answering, the question "whether prejudice against discrete and insular minori-
ties may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspond-
ingly more searchingjudicial inquiry.").
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ment of this supremacy of law over government. Thus, the third
principle of the rule of law requires the existence of an independent
and politically neutral judiciary that is broadly accessible to aggrieved
individuals. By extension, the establishment by the state of ajudiciary is
not enough. In a complex modem society, a class of legal professionals
is necessary; so, too, therefore, are supporting institutions like law
schools, bar associations, and other non-state organizations. At its most
basic level, the tribunals established by the state and open to a profes-
sional, non-state class of advocates must be able to give legal meaning
to rights. From a criminal perspective, that means the rigorous applica-
tion of established procedures to force the state to meet a standard of
proof for its charges. From a civil perspective, it means that rights are
not merely hortatory. To quote another ancient maxim: ubi jus ibi
remedium - for every right there is a remedy. 40 That these aspects of
judicial process to hear legal claims or present a defense have a deep,
intrinsic importance to the rule of law is embedded in this phrase. The
Latin word "jus" contrasts with "lex" in much the same way that a
"fundamental right" or higher "principle of law" contrasts with a simple
"statute" or other positivist expression of parliamentary or executive
will. English lacks this distinction, retained in French (loi versus droit)
or Russian (npa(3o [pravo] versus aaxom [zakon]). The ancient phrase is
not, nor could it sensibly be ubi lex ibi remedium and retain its meaning
for a rule-of-law state.4 '
B. Institutional Problems of the Rule of Law
As principles go, these three concepts are fairly clear. But how do
they manifest themselves in political systems, and when, and why?
Political scientists interested in transitions from authoritarianism should
explore the problems presented in the practical application of these
principles and the prerequisites to their development, with as much
vigor as they demonstrate in seeking to demystify and decode the
40. Tracy A. Thomas, Ubi Jus, Ibi Remedium: The Fundamental Right to a Remedy Under Due
Process, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1633 (2004); Dicey, supra note 26, at 199. But see Webster v. Doe, 486
U.S. 592, 611-613 (1988) (Scalia,J., dissenting) (rejecting absolute application of this principle in
the context of American constitutional law).
41. See, e.g., Gianmaria Ajani, The Rise and Fall of the Law-Based State in the Experience of Russian
Legal Scholarship: Foreign Patterns and Domestic Style, in TOWARD THE RuLE OF LAW IN RuSsIA?:
POLrr-CAL AND LGAL REFORMS IN THE TRANsION PERIOD, supra note 35, at 5 ("While, in complying
with the notion of the rule of law, the political power that governs the state is subordinated to a law
that it has not directly produced, in the case of Rechtstaat, the state subordinates itself to its 'own'
law.").
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principles that define legitimate elections, parliamentary systems, and
civil society. That is not to demand that they descend into the legal
minutiae and statutory interpretation that fascinate the practicing
lawyer or law professor. But if comparative politics is to insist - and
rightly so - on the rule of law as a sine qua non for consolidated
democracy, then this insistence can only have real meaning if the full
meaning of the term is more deeply plumbed and its empirical prob-
lems more thoroughly studied.
The overarching principle of law's supremacy over politics is a
concept with tangible ramifications that political scientists can observe
and measure. As noted above, for there really to be "no offense without
law," the boundaries of the law must be knowable and clearly stated in
general terms. The criminal law cannot be made retroactive to prohibit
past conduct. Thus, the failure to publish legal acts, or the passage by a
parliament of secret laws (such as laws on state secrets), bills of
attainder, or laws retroactively criminalizing past conduct, are all
indicia of a system in which law still struggles with politics for ultimate
supremacy. Likewise, lawmakers must enact laws in good faith and
under an assumption of capacity, i.e. there must not be laws that create
duties that are impossible to perform.42 The work of parliaments is
readily susceptible to such observation.
Another avenue for exploration is the practical application of consti-
tutions and laws, a refrain that will be familiar to sovietologists and
specialists on the satellite states of the former Soviet Union. Are
constitutional rights merely aspirational statements without practical
effect or are they cognizable in a court of law? Does every right really
have a legal remedy and does every legal person have an equal right to
seek that remedy? Are these remedies for injury available not just
against another citizen, but against the state? Can the military be called
to account for violation of the law? Are there spheres of state authority
or even geographic areas of the state in which the law is suspended or
otherwise does not fully apply?
In addition to assessing the empirical level of equality before the law,
political scientists are well-equipped to hypothesize reasons for such
equality to develop or be suppressed. For example, Stephen Holmes
has argued that equality before the law is correlated with the level of
42. RAWLS, supra note 7, at 208 ("[O]ught implies can.... [Th]e actions which the rules of
law require and forbid should be of a kind which men can reasonably be expected to do and to
avoid."). As Lon Fuller observed, "[t] o command what cannot be done is not to make law; it is to
unmake law, for a command that cannot be obeyed serves no end but confusion, fear and chaos."
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAw 37 (rev. ed. 1969).
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pluralism in society. Thus, where many groups of roughly equal politi-
cal strength exist and compete for leverage vis-a-vis the state, Holmes
says that we should expect the state to be pressured to promote greater
equality before the law. Conversely, when pluralism decreases and
there exist fewer powerful social groups and more opportunity for the
state to play one group against others (or for state co-optation by one
group against others), the society may move away from an approxima-
tion of rule of law and closer to "rule by law" or "rule through law."
43
These are hypotheses that political scientists are uniquely well-placed
to test.
Similarly, the extent that a judicial system follows the rule of law is
susceptible to political science methods and standards of measure-
ment. The integrity of the judicial process can be assessed. Do the
courts regularly turn to rules of evidence and fixed procedures that
govern fact-finding? Do the courts routinely create a written record of
their findings? Are there ascertainable signs of due process in legal
proceedings, i.e. do tribunals operate in an open forum, treat all
parties equally, and adhere to a process designed to facilitate rational
inquiry into the relevant circumstances of allegations that the law has
been violated? Are court orders practically enforceable?
The courts, in order to function, must have institutional guarantees
of security regardless of the outcome of cases before it.44 Thus, what is
the tenure of judges, and how are they removed from office? What
protections do judges enjoy against political interference in their work?
Are courts provided sufficient resources to function independently? Do
necessary supporting institutions exist?45 Another part of this security,
43. Stephen Holmes, Lineages of the Rule of Law, in Maravall & Przeworski, supra note 11, at
22-23. If Holmes is right, than an extension of that hypothesis might suggest that certain
procedural rights (e.g. notice, confrontation, etc.) are powerful indicators of the existence of rule
of law, since these mechanisms are usable by all interest groups, and especially by the weaker
against the politically more powerful.
44. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 32-33 (1960) ("If (as
in medieval times) a tribunal can be penalized for 'wrongjudgment,' a factor of fear enters which
increases chanciness of outcome. If a boss will fine, fire, exile or kill for a vote orjudgment which
annoys him, but may reward the willing, then in any case in which his interest is not obvious, one
big weight in the scales may drop blind until one knows the whether and the which-way of the fix.
England's lesson under the Stuarts, and then under the Hanovers, ran indeed less to such
uncertainty in lesser cases than to altogether too much certainty when the Crown was openly on
one side, but we have seen enough in modem Europe to know that judicial servility produces not
only injustice but a day-to-day unreckonability.").
45. Then sitting RF Supreme Court ChiefJustice Viacheslav Lebedev emphasized a long list
of practical problems for a functioning legal system at a conference at the Brookings Institution in
January 1993: "recruitment, appointment, compensation, and training ofjudges, the efficiency of
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as well as an intrinsic element of a rule-of-law based judiciary, is the
requirement of published opinions of the court, including a published
dissent when multiple judges are empanelled to hear a single case.
Published opinions promote publicity, predictability and steadiness of
the body of law, while avoiding secret action or favor, by creating
pressure to conduct careful analysis of the facts and issues before the
court, tojustify with law and reason the decision that is made.
Who are the judges, lawyers, and bailiffs charged with operating this
system? Judicial institutions require judges who are trained to decide
cases, not to mention the advocates trained to present them. The same
methods can be turned to examine the judges and lawyers that staff
such a system. How are they trained and chosen? If the judicial
institution is to operate in a rule-of-law state, then its legitimacy and
efficacy will largely be dependent on its constitution by what Karl
Llewellyn called "law-conditioned" officials, whose legal education,
training, and experience combine to generate a particular habit of
legal thinking.46 This professionalization, in turn, implies the existence
of supporting non-state institutions, like a professional bar and law
schools.47
The political culture that pervades legislative and judicial institu-
tions, like the mass attitudes that exert influence on them, are also
amenable to analysis. Do legislators have a basic understanding of these
rule-of-law principles? Do citizens have trust in courts to adjudicate
their disputes dispassionately and strictly in accordance with the law?
How do citizens view the legal system in general? Do citizens turn to
lawyers to aid them in understanding their rights, or is such an idea
considered naive, futile, or even dangerous?
These questions are not merely a laundry list. Systematic compari-
sons of Russian law over time and with other legal systems can be made
communications and recordkeeping systems, the adequacy of facilities for subordinate federal
tribunals, the effectiveness of mechanisms for enforcing judicial decisions, the relationships
between federal and nonfederal court systems, and the relationships between judicial officers and
political officials at all levels." See Bruce L.R. Smith, Constitutionalism in the New Russia, in LAW AND
DEMOCRACY IN THE NEW RussiA 1, 14 (Bruce L. R Smith & Gennady M. Danilenko, eds., 1993).
46. LLEWELLVN, supra note 44, at 19-20 ("They have been law-conditioned. They see things,
they see significances, both through law-spectacles, in terms of torts and trusts and corporations
and due process and motions to dismiss; and this is the way they sort and size up any welter of facts.
Moreover, they think like lawyers, not like laymen .. . ."). Although Llewellyn is interested
exclusively in the American law-conditioned judge, his observation is congruent with this
rule-of-law requirement.
47. Llewellyn recognized, and we should, too, the dangers of overprofessionalization. See id
at 23 n.14. To this risk the countermajoritarian hazards ofjudicial activism should be added.
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by probing the different manifestations of these three principles.
C. The Rule of Law as a Causeway
The metaphor of a causeway better expresses the conception of the
rule of law outlined above than an instrumentalist metaphor of sword
or shield. More importantly, it is precisely this conception that should
be the focus of a state in which ruling elites seek to establish a
consolidated democracy. The value of this causeway lies first in the free
movement of citizens that it facilitates among state and non-state
institutions in daily life, commerce, and politics. The law is what
enables the citizen to know what actions he is permitted to take and
what constitutes a transgressive behavior of the law. If the citizen strays
from this known path, choosing not to make use of the protections of
the law or engaging in unlawful activity, that peril is known, too. These
two aspects of the law as a causeway - establishing secure avenues for
social interaction and identifiable paths of licit conduct - are of
tremendous value to citizens in a state emerging from authoritarian
rule into, perhaps, the early stages of democratic government. This
conception of the rule of law shifts the initial conception of the state
from a gendarme to a traffic policeman.
Negotiation over the establishment of this legal causeway is exactly
the sort of activity in which the political elite should be engaged in the
early, critical period of a new or struggling democracy. This process
goes hand in hand with establishing the "rules of the game" for
repeated electoral competition. Planning a legal causeway is another
way of emphasizing that elites should be engaged in establishing the
parameters of state power: where it begins, how far it extends, and
where it stops. Thus, viewing the rule of law as a causeway also makes
clear that certain spheres of life are simply none of the state's business.
There exists a world of private activity and decisions into which no one
would want the law to intrude (e.g. the decision to procreate, the
choice of religion, etc.). What Bernard Rudden has called the "pre-
cious sphere of non-law" is readily identifiable by the metaphor of a
causeway: it is what lies off the path in the bramble bush of human
relations that are best left unencumbered by the state's legislation. 48
The direct relationship between the rule of law and individual liberty
is also better expressed by the causeway metaphor than by visions of the
48. Rudden, supra note 27, at 17, 21.
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law as sword or shield.49 When the state sets forth what activity is
protected and what is prohibited, and acknowledges the limits of state
power, it has established for the citizen "a basis for legitimate expecta-
tions[,] ... grounds upon which persons can rely on one another and
rightly object when their expectations are not fulfilled. If the bases of
these claims are unsure, so are the boundaries of men's liberties."50 If,
in the words Bolt placed in the mouth of Thomas More, the citizen
keeps to the causeway, he may walk safely: no offense against the state is
hidden, his rights against all comers are clear. John Rawls stated this
relationship well:
But if the precept of no crime without a law is violated, say by
statutes, being vague and imprecise, what we are at liberty to do
is likewise vague and imprecise. The boundaries of our liberty
are uncertain. And to the extent that this is so, liberty is
restricted by a legitimate fear of its exercise. The same sort of
consequences follow if similar cases are not treated similarly, if
the judicial process lacks its essential integrity, if the law does
not recognize impossibility of performance as a defense, and so
on.... To be confident in the possession and exercise of these
freedoms, the citizens of a well-ordered society will normally
want the rule of law maintained.
Knowing what things it penalizes and knowing that these are
within their power to do or not to do, citizens can draw up their
49. Dicey, supra note 26, at 203 (a constitution should not be "the source but the conse-
quence of the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts."). Dicey presents a
consequentialist rationale for this principle, as well as an empirical one:
[W] here the right to individual freedom is a result deduced from the principles of the
constitution, the idea readily occurs that the right is capable of being suspended or
taken away. Where, on the other hand, the right to individual freedom is part of the
constitution because it is inherent in the ordinary law of the land, the right is one which
can hardly be destroyed without a thorough revolution in the institutions and manners
of the nation.
Id. at 201.
50. RAwLs, supra note 7, at 207.
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plans accordingly. One who complies with the announced rules
need never fear an infringement of his liberty.
51
There are many reasons why this should be so. A stable institutional
environment permits the calculation of risk and affords a certain
degree of predictability to the results of contemplated social interac-
tions. This is so not only for the citizen vis-a-vis citizen, but also for the
citizen in relation to the state. Nowhere is this facet of the rule of law
more important, or more easily identified, than in the criminal law that
punishes transgression with the deprivation of liberty. But the common
law or private civil law that regulates relations between citizens also
presents a causeway. It is this area of law that creates a "legal matrix"
that defines who has legal capacity and enables those "legal persons" to
own, trade, contract, and dispose of things and to recognize and
enforce the legal obligations of others.5 Individuals can contract with
each other (or with the state for that matter) and know, so long as they
stay on this causeway, what routes they can take to secure their interests
with the aid of the state's neutral courts and bailiffs.
The metaphor of the rule of law as some sort of instrument or
weapon captures none of these core understandings of the rule of law.
The reach of the law as tool or weapon cannot be known in advance
like a causeway can be mapped. Its power, like its boundaries, is also
likely to be unknown until the moment the weapon is tried in some
legal contest. The principle that the law applies universally to all is also
confused by the notion implicit in this bellicose metaphor that some
individuals seem to have more right to wield the sword of law than
others. Thus, the law-as-weapon metaphor necessarily renders suspect
the state's capacity to establish a "neutral judiciary" for the resolution
51. Id. at 210-11, 211-12.
52. The phrase "legal matrix," as well as this understanding of private civil law, is borrowed
from Rudden, supra note 27 at 17, 20-21. As a metaphor, law as matrix is broadly compatible with
the more literary (but perhaps less pliable) law as causeway. Professor Rudden's deliberate
separation of the uses of private civil law first as matrix and then "as shield," id. at 17, 21, 30-34, 43,
I consider to be evidence that the causeway metaphor is viable as a freestanding explanatory
concept. Indeed, some of what Professor Rudden considers to operate as "shield," such as the
protection given citizens by the principle that the State as contractor/debtor/etc. is no less bound
by the civil law than any other "legal person," may as well be viewed as "causeway": the citizen can
travel through various transactions with the State secure in the knowledge that both are juridical
equals, and therefore equally obliged to observe the same rules of the road that govern their
relationship. The advantage that I see is that a causeway cannot be turned into the weapon that a
sharp-edged shield may become; with all the attendant perceptions of law as weapon of change,
revolution, empowerment in a zero-sum political game.
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of disputes. How could the law be used as a weapon against the state in
the state's own forum? Is not a verdict for the state, then, a blow against
the people who would use the law as a sword or shield? These are the
loaded questions that Marxist legal theory answers in the negative, a
preconception that Bolshevik legal nihilists delightfully embraced to
destroy the gossamer threads of the rule of law that existed in the tsarist
legal system.
What is more, instrumentalist metaphors of law, even at their most
benign, cast the relationship between the state and the individual
immediately into an adversarial posture. The state is inherently suspect,
and the citizens' protection against its necessarily adverse motives lies
in the law. Law as weapon envisions a zero-sum battle between state and
the individual: one for the law's power and the other for the law's
protection. The state's loss is therefore the individual's gain. What a
corrosive set of assumptions in a state seeking to leave behind the
oppressive vestiges of authoritarian rule! Given Russia's authoritarian
and totalitarian pasts, it is understandable that political scientists
should be attracted to the latter instrumentalist metaphor of law as a
tool or weapon in the hands of citizens to protect their rights from an
aggressive, intrusive, or feckless state. As Valerie Bunce observed,
"much of the discourse on democratization (and on economic reform)
emphasizes arguments that appear to support less, not more, state and
thus the notion of state subtraction... and with the need to reign in
the state."53 Instrumentalist metaphors of the rule of law implicitly
accept this premise of state subtraction. It is the rule of law as "Kmo Koao"
[kto kogo - who over whom], an embrace of the idiom of "3aon caK
ab Zuwo" [zakon kak dyshlo - law as wagon shaft].
Finally, if the point of electoral politics in a democracy is to provide
sufficient enough of a guarantee to the losing party that it will have
future chances for victory for it to remain faithful to the "rules of the
game," it then it seems strange to adopt an instrumentalist metaphor of
the rule of law that implicitly sets the individual at odds with the state.
The process of placing constraints on the breadth and reach of a new,
putative democracy is not necessarily more effective - and may be more
difficult - when framed in an adversarial context of offense and
defense. Among the salutary effects of the rule of law on other core
features of a consolidated democracy - such as a robust civil society - is
the ability of the rule of law to promote a conciliation between the state
53. Bunce, supra note 8, at 714.
2006]
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
and its citizens. 54 The rule-of-law causeway promotes a conception of
the state that instrumentalist metaphors cannot: a state that has the
power to conduct what is identifiably its business - securing borders,
promoting economic stability, and the like - while limiting the state's
power to employ its monopoly on the legitimate use of force against the
individual in ways that deprive the individual of his established legal
rights. 55 Thus, for example, the codification of private civil law separate
and apart from the laws that the state adopts for the health and safety of
all (e.g. criminal law, labor law, antitrust, etc.) establishes relationships
to property and other persons that are largely "not the State's busi-
ness .... if people act in good faith and stay licit, the State will stay
away.
"56
These metaphors, of course, are not mutually exclusive. In a well-
established, consolidated democracy, we may well want the rule of law
to operate as a causeway in some instances and as a sword or shield in
other circumstances. My argument is simply that the salutary expecta-
tions for the effect of the rule of law on an emerging democracy are
met by those aspects of the concept captured by the causeway meta-
phor and hindered by those aspects of the concept captured by
instrumentalist metaphors of sword, shield, or tool. Thus, like the
choice whether to hold nationwide or regional elections first, the
sequencing of rule-of-law objectives is important. In a consolidated
democracy with a long history of the rule of law, the law may work
simultaneously as causeway, sword, and shield. There may come a time
when law is sufficiently embedded in the political culture, institutions,
and expectations of a society that the kind of countermajoritarian legal
activism best described by the law-as-weapon metaphor can be toler-
ated, if not even viewed as an occasional necessary corrective to
democratic abuses (e.g. the American Civil Rights Movement). But in
an unsteady system such as Russia's, teetering along a series of tipping
points, the causeway should be privileged over all other conceptions of
law. This is both because of the salutary effects of such conceptions for
the other arenas of a consolidated democracy and because it is less
complicated and possibly less expensive. In a world of limited re-
54. This effect echoes what Hendley describes as the "reciprocal" sense of law: "a vision of law
as a means of structuring society based on broadly shared values." Hendley, supra note 23, at 4.
55. This is not to deny that the legal process of remedying injury is inherently adversarial.
Litigants defend their rights in court, sometimes as against the whole world all at once (e.g. to settle
title to abandoned property). The causeway metaphor does not deny this truism. It better
captures, however, the well-defined boundaries of action understood by all participants.
56. Rudden, supra note 27, at 17, 21.
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sources, in which the political leaders of an emerging democracy face
severe constraints on what reforms to conduct and in what order, a
metaphor of the rule of law that encourages the simultaneous develop-
ment of state and society within each's own spheres is to be encour-
aged.
III. THE RuLE OF LAW IN MODERN RussiaN HISTORY
A. Imperial Russia
The law in Imperial Russia, much like that country's famously
impassable roads, was never a citizen's causeway.5 7 "[T] he most striking
and important contrast between [pre-nineteenth century] Russia and
the rest of Europe," S.E. Finer noted, "was that the country had no
tradition of what we have called 'law-boundedness'."5 8 Russia lacked
any "systemic body of private law, nor any trained jurists or advo-
cates." 9 Peter the Great's procuracy was established "[plrecisely be-
cause there was no professionalized judiciary, and notably none who
could control maladministration. "60
Tsarist attempts to systematize Russian law contrasted markedly with
efforts at codification in continental Europe, especially after the French
Revolution. The tsars saw the law in strictly instrumentalist, and often
paternalistic, terms: "a higher priority on the outcome of particular
cases than on the strict observance of procedural or substantive rules,
and a perception of law as intrinsic to those who exercised authority. "61
57. It is not the purpose of this Article to discuss the origins of Russia's stark divergence from
the legal histories of Western European states. That fact is taken as well-established. Much has
already been written about the revolutionary historical events that swept through Western Europe
but bypassed Russia: the medieval "Reception" of Roman law, the assertion of Papal supremacy by
Gregory VII in the 11th century (credited with the creation of separate legal "systems" of secular,
canon and other law), the Renaissance, etc. See e.g. BERMAN, supra note 12, passim; GENNADY M.
DANILENKO & WILLIAM BURNHAM, LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 2-3 (2d ed.
2000); JEFFREY D. SACHS & KATHARINA PISTOR, Introduction to THE RULE OF LAw AND ECONOMIC
REFORM IN RuSSia 4 (1997).
Instead, Kievan Rus fell under Mongol subjugation for nearly 250 years. "Had Kiev survived,"
one scholar has speculated, "in the course of time universities might have opened, law might have
been systematically taught, commentaries compiled, a legal profession formed, and the Russian
legal system might have come to resemble others of the Romanist tradition more closely." WILLIAM
E. BUTLER, RUSSIAN LAw 18 (2d ed. 2003).
58. 3 S.E. FINER, THE HISTORY OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE EARLIEST TIMES: EMPIRES, MONARCHIES
AND THE MODERN STATE 1407 (1999).
59. Id. at 1407.
60. Id. at 1419.
61. WILLIAM G. WAGNER, MARRIAGE, PROPERTY, AND LAW IN LATE IMPERIAL RUSSIA 5 (1994).
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The eagerness with which Peter and his successors proclaimed the law,
which meant little more than setting the will of the sovereign down in
writing, demonstrates a core difference between the rule of law and
rule through laws. A century after ChiefJustice Coke sparred withJames
I over the king's ability to interfere in cases before his own law courts,
Peter the Great declared that "His Majesty is a sovereign monarch who
is not obliged to answer for his acts to anyone in the world., 62 The
rule-of-law principle that all law applies equally to all had no place in
imperial Russia.
Even this "rule through law" was a norm to which successive Russian
autocrats found it difficult to adhere. The Nakaz (Instruction) of
Catherine the Great, innovative (though, ultimately, impotent) as it
was for Russia, did little but expose the resistance of the empress and
her officials to even the most generalized constraints on executive
power. 63 Law was still the personal possession of the tsarina, and
neither she nor her officials could rid themselves of the same personal-
ized and paternalistic understandings that they brought to any other
mechanism of state authority. From the reign of Catherine through
that of Nicholas I and Russia's humiliation in the Crimean War, little
had changed. On the eve of Speranskii's codification of the laws under
Nicholas I, "[a] full record of the law did not exist, and much of what
did exist was inaccessible, not to say unknowable, by official and citizen
alike."64 Provincial and district courts were staffed by noblemen in
need of money and in even greater need for legal training. Appellate
courts were folded into various Senate departments, with the expected
result that legal judgment and political expediency were often indistin-
guishable. Public sources of law were scarce, its discussion rarer still,
and law faculties trained noblemen (when they sought training) for a
lifetime of state service, not independent legal thought. The administra-
tion of Russian law required neither a trained judiciary nor a profes-
sional bar, published sources of law, or any precondition on what
counted as law beyond the will of the autocrat.
65
The liberal judicial reform of Alexander II was the most dramatic
62. FINER, supra note 58, at 1414 (quoting Military Service Regulations of 1716).
63. See WAGNER, supra note 61, at 5-6; NIcHOLAs V. RIASANOVSKY, A HIsTORY OF RussIA 258-59
(5th ed. 1993); BUTLER, supra note 57, at 27. The same criticism could be made of Catherine the
Great's court reform of 1775. See DANL.NKo & BuRNHiAM, supra note 57, at 5.
64. BtyLER, supra note 57, at 29.
65. As even the conservative Slavophile Ivan Aksakov could observe: "The old court! At the
mere recollection of it one's hair stands on end and one's flesh begins to creep!" RiASANOVSKY,
supra note 63, at 376.
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challenge to this understanding of the role of law in imperial Russia,
and the last. Despite their short lifespan - structural reforms began in
1864, reactionary counter-reforms followed an assassination attempt
on the tsar in 1866, and the last vestiges of the reform were wiped clean
with the first Bolshevik decrees of the October Revolution in 1917 - the
reforms had a tremendous impact on Russian law. And although they
never accomplished (nor were intended to create) a rule-of-law state in
the Russian Empire, their short course provides a glimpse at the
practical difficulties even basic legal reforms presented to the regime.
The reforms depended notjust on legislated changes announced from
above, but on decades of support for legal education and a gradual
shift in behavioral norms and attitudes.
The elements of these short-lived legal reforms are well-known to all:
the establishment of a unified system of courts independent of the state
bureaucracy, security of tenure for an educated class of jurists, the
abolition of secret judicial proceedings, general equality before the
law, the simplification of legal process, public trials, and trial by jury for
serious criminal offenses. 66 Requirements that jurists obtain both for-
mal legal training and adequate experience prior to appointment to
the bench constrained the power of the state to reward members of the
nobility for their service with judicial positions. Judges were instructed
to apply laws that were facially unclear or contradictory according to
the "general meaning" of the law. Appellate courts (courts of cassation)
were to publish their decisions in part to provide such guidance.67 The
Civil and Criminal Cassation Departments of the Imperial Senate were
established at the pinnacle of this judicial hierarchy, with considerable
effect on the development of modern legal doctrine.68
The reform itself was preceded, and only made possible by systematic
legal training begun in the 1830s by Nicholas I under the supervision of
Mikhail Speranskii, who simultaneously had set about the codification
of all Russian imperial legislation and normative acts since nearly the
start of Romanov rule. Legal training worked a sea change on legal
personnel, turning them from an uneducated, grasping nobility to a
trained class of jurists with concrete ideas about the role of law in
66. Id. at 376-77.
67. WAGNER, supra note 61, at 41.
68. Id. at 45 ("This was an unprecedented situation for tsarist Russia. There now existed not
only a reasonably successful system for interpreting and enforcing civil law uniformly throughout
the empire, but also an agency capable of creating law in an important area of civil affairs which
was independent of the direct control of the autocrat.").
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society.69 Bar associations formed to regulate the profession, assist in
the practical training of new lawyers, and provide legal aid to the
poor.70 But the regime that thought that more lawyers would increase
order in a Russia that was rapidly seeking economic growth after a
disastrous Crimean War, was also deeply fearful of these new, educated
professionals and (rightly) suspicious of their loyalty to the existing
autocratic order.7 ' As with Alexander's reforms of state education,
conservative curricula did not appear to resolve this internal contradic-
tion. What one contemporary commentator said of the regime's educa-
tion reforms applies equally to its hopes for a rekindled legal profes-
sion: "o-iu xomeu aHna, Komopu&6b11 e ct3" [oni khoteli ognya, kotorii by ne
zh'g - "They wanted fires that would not bum."].
This short period in nineteenth century Russia, however, also shows
how difficult establishing the rule of law can be, and how easy it is to
destroy its development in its early stages. By 1866, following an
assassination attempt, Alexander II already began to retreat from his
reforms. As the fear of radicalism spread through the state apparatus,
more and more classes of cases were excepted from the general judicial
system (which already excepted military and church issues, as well as
the entire peasantry from its jurisdiction).72 Press laws established the
extra-judicial enforcement of media sanctions, categories of political
crimes were expanded and special tribunals convened to hear such
cases with restricted access to juries. Following the assassination of
Alexander II in 1881, whole regions of Russia could be placed under
states of emergency that excluded the courts altogether.73
The celebrated case of Vera Zasulich illustrates many of these
69. Id. at 13-14. In 1854, there were 44 law professors in the Russian Empire; by 1913 this
number had grown to 111. Id. at 28. Between 1840 and 1863, approximately 4000 students
received law degrees. Id. Between 1864 and 1900, this number grew to roughly 24,000 students. Id.
As a result, by 1870, three-quarters of the members of appellate and district courts that had been
created by the judicial reform had specialized legal training. Id. at 16. By 1890, this figure had
grown to over ninety percent. Id See also BUTLER, supra note 57, at 30, 56-67 (introducing the legal
thinkers who were the fruits of these efforts).
70. WAGNER, supra note 61, at 32. Although civil litigation skyrocketed as a result of the
increased availability of lawyers and the gradual professionalization of the courts, mass attitudes
toward the legal profession were not necessarily greatly improved. See, e.g., ANTON CHEKHOV,
Ivanov, in IvANov, THE SEAGULL AND THREE SisRsis 6, 10 (Ronald Hingley trans., Oxford University
Press 1968) (1887) ("Doctors are like lawyers, only lawyers just rob you, while doctors rob you and
murder you as well."). Of course, Chekhov, a physician by training, expressed an antagonism that
was hardly unique to Russian society.
71. SeeBUTLER, supra note 57, at 31.
72. RiAsANovsKY, supra note 63, at 377.
73. WAGNER, supra note 61, at 52-53.
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deficiencies. In 1878, Zasulich sought to avenge the unlawful flogging
of a fellow student by shooting the military governor of St. Petersburg,
General Fyodor Trepov. That Zasulich had fired the shots that wounded
Trepov was widely acknowledged; her motives, however, led the state
(rightly, as it turned out) to fear that a sympathetic jury would acquit
her. Through what would be called "telephone justice" in the Soviet
period, enormous pressure was put on the trial court, which was
chaired by perhaps the most famous legal mind of his day, the liberal
Anatolii Koni. Pressed repeatedly by the state to ensure a guilty verdict,
Koni gave the answers dictated by the rule of law: "[a] 111 can assure in
this case is the observance of complete impartiality and all the guaran-
tees of correct justice."74 Koni pledged to do his duty: "the impartial
observance of the law."75 The response of the Minister of Justice who
applied the pressure on Koni, Count Konstantin Palen, typifies the
results-driven view of the law held by Russian officialdom: "Indeed,
justice, impartiality! ... but in this accursed affair the government has
a right to expect special services from the court and from you....
[T] here are cases which must be viewed.., politically."76
Another example of law as simply another source of imperial
patronage was the chartering of corporations. Each corporate char-
ter was a grant from the monarch, set out in the form of a law. Thus,
sprinkled throughout the various compilations of laws and decrees
were the details of every corporation lawfully in operation in the
Russian Empire. 77 Although cartels and syndicates grew more numer-
ous and more powerful during the economic boom in fin-de-sicle
Russia, laws prohibiting price-fixing were never removed from the
statute books. Whether this confused state of the law was deliberate,
intended to keep the corporate elite fearful and submissive, or
merely the typical failings of the tsarist bureaucracy is unclear.7 8 The
government nevertheless gave an informal nod to cartel develop-
ment, granting charters to its preferred syndicates in specific mar-
kets. The government thus maintained its flexibility in dealing with
these cartels: "the formal illegality of cartels and syndicates allowed
74. Id. at 8.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 8-9.
77. Thomas C. Owen, Autocracy and the Rule of Law in Russian Economic History, in THE RuLE OF
LAW AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN RUSSIA, 23, 25 (Jeffrey D. Sachs and Katharina Pistor eds., 1997).
The author references the Polnoe Sobranie zakonov (1649-1913) and the Sobranie uzakonenii i
rasporiazenii pravitel'stva (1863-1917).
78. Id. at 33.
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the state, as one liberal jurist put it, to 'seize a random victim' from
time to time." 79 The result was a classic example of the law used as a
tool, and not as a causeway. Caught in the contradiction between
government encouragement and existing statutory prohibitions, the
oligarchs of the day could not know what path was the lawful one
that could secure their business interests. They could only hope to
remain in good standing with the regime long enough to secure
their profits. The regime's approach to private threats to state
economic power parallels in some ways the approach taken by
President Putin against his own opposing oligarchs. Such traps are
much harder to spring when law serves as a causeway rather than as a
tool of control.
B. Soviet Russia, 1917-1985
The rule of law had no place in the Soviet political system. Although
Soviet leaders varied in their appreciation for the use of law and lawyers
to their regime, Marxist-Leninist ideology dictated an extreme and
unvarying instrumentalism towards all legal institutions. This view was
most succinctly stated by Stalin's Commissar ofJustice, Nikolai Krylenko:
The court is, and still remains, the only thing it can be by its
nature as an organ of the government power - a weapon for the
safeguarding of the interests of a given ruling class... A club is
a primitive weapon, a rifle is a more efficient one, the most
efficient is the court... For us there is no difference between a
court of law and summary justice.... The court is an organ of
state administration and as such does not differ in its nature from
any other organs of administration which are designed, as the
court is, to carry out one and the same governmental policy .... 8o
Vladimir Lenin, the most famous expellee from the law faculty at
Kazan' University, knew enough about the power of the law to make it
the subject of his first decrees after the October Revolution. 81 Decree #
1 on the courts (enacted Dec. 5, 1917) abolished or suspended all
79. Id.
80. Quoted in 1 VLADiMmR GsovsKi, SOVIET CIVIL LAw SYSTEM 241 (1948). Krylenko was executed
in 1938.
81. Decrees abolished all private property (Nov. 8, 1917), confiscated church property (Jan.
23, 1918), annulled stocks and bonds (Jan. 28, 1918), and forbade inheritance (Apr. 27, 1918).
Between 1918 and 1919, government monopolies were declared over all copyrights, patents,
banking, insurance, foreign trade, railways, and the merchant marine. By November 1920, all
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tsarist courts. 82 Investigating magistrates, prosecutors, and private law-
yers were also all abolished and the practice of law thrown open to "all
who enjoy civil rights."8 3 Revolutionary tribunals, chaired by a triumvi-
rate of one local judge and two proletarian lay assessors were estab-
lished to deal with counter-revolutionary crimes. What these crimes
might be was difficult to say: all imperial law was declared null and void,
and reference to it was only permitted to the extent that it did not
contradict the party programmes of the SD/SR coalition provisional
government, its edicts, and what was termed "peoiool4uoHioe
npa0cowa-ue' [ revoliutsionnoe pravosoznanie] - revolutionary legal con-
sciousness - the gut instinct of proletariat justice.8 4 By July 1918, any
use of imperial laws and procedural codes was strictly prohibited. 85
The Red Terror was a time of confessions extracted by torture,
procedureless hearings, and summary judgment. The understanding
of law during this period was marked by a sense of anarchism and legal
nihilism; state and law were both expected to whither away with the
approach of a communist utopia.8 6 The first president of the USSR
Supreme Court, Pyotr Stuchka, summarized this view: "Communism
means not the victory of socialist law, but the victory of socialism over
any law, since with the abolition of classes with their antagonistic
interests, law will die out altogether." 7 By definition, revolutionary
legal consciousness meant the rejection of the principle "no offense
without law" - an offense during the Red Terror was whatever offended
industry operating with a workforce larger than ten laborers was nationalized. See GSOvsRI, supra
note 80, passim.
82. SAMUEL KUCHEROV, THE ORGANS OF SOVIET ADMINISTRATION OFJUSTICE: THEIR HISTORY AND
OPERATION 22-24 (1970).
83. Id. at 24. See also HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE USSR: AN INTERPRETATION OF SOVIET
LAw 31 (Rev. ed. 1966).
84. BERMAN, supra note 83, at 31. SD/SR refers to the Social Democrat Socialist Revolution-
ary.
85. KUCHEROV, supra note 82, at 39. Political necessity forced a slight retreat from the initial
draconian decree. Decree #2 (March 7, 1918) created circuit courts above the local people's
courts. Id. at 36. However, since pre-revolutionary legal codes and the lawyers trained in them had
been abolished,jurisdiction was a haphazard affair. Id, at 36-37. Once the Bolsheviks regained the
upper hand, Decree #3 (July 20, 1918) and a special instruction issued a few days later, rejected
any use of the pre-revolutionary laws and procedural codes. Id. at 38-40; see also F.J.M. FELOBRUGGE,
RUSSIAN LAw: THE END OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM AND THE ROLE OF LAw (1993).
86. FELDBRUGGE, supra note 85, at 201. See also E.L. JOHNSON, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOVIET
LEGAL SYSTEM 33 (1969).
87. BERMAN, supra note 83, at 26.
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the proletariat, as led by the vanguard Bolshevik faction.8 8 Equality
before the law was similarly rejected; Marxism-Leninism decried such a
notion as false in the face of class inequality.8 9 And the principle of an
independent judiciary had no place in a system under which every
organ of the state was designed to implement the state's policies. As
Evgeny Pashukanis, one of the Bolsheviks' leading legal theorists,
explained, "Revolutionary legality is for us a problem which is 99%
political."90
As the years of War Communism drew to a close, the necessities of
Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) drove the Bolsheviks to reverse
their earlier rejection of legal formalism. The NEP sought to revive a
starving and devastated society with "a temporary retreat on the road to
socialism," permitting limited private enterprise, property, and small-
scale industry.9' Even a minor-level market economy required regula-
tion. Thus, revolutionary legal consciousness was replaced with a
massive codification drive.92 In his last days, Lenin lamented over the
apparatus which ".... we took over from tsarism and slightly anointed
with Soviet oil."93 Stuchka, likewise, admitted the near impossibility of a
total break with tsarist law: "We only imagined that we abolished the
88. The "Leading Principles of Criminal Law," enacted by the People's Commissariat of
Justice in 1919, essentially stated the goal of using the criminal law as a revolutionary tool against
any bourgeois opposition, breakers, and intermediate classes before achieving the ultimate goal of
the destruction of "law as a function of the state." See BERMAN, supra note 83, at 32.
89. M. Ya. Latsis, an assistant of Feliks Dzerzhinsky, gave the following instruction to the
All-Russian Extraordinary Commission for Combating Counterrevolution and Sabotage (known
by its cyrillic initials as the "Cheka"), the precursor to the NKVD and, ultimately, the KGB:
We are destroying the bourgeoisie as a class. Do not look, during the investigation, for
material as to whether the accused acted against the Soviet power by word or deed. The
first question you have to present to him is as to what class does he belong, what are his
origin, education, training or profession. These questions have to decide about the fate
of the accused.
KUCHEROV, supra note 82, at 57.
90. BERMAN, supra note 83, at 43. Pashukanis argued that law was essentially a development of
the marketplace and, as such, all law was reducible to the law of contracts. Pashukanis would later
recant all of his theories in a vain attempt to stave off execution in 1937. Id. at 27-28; see also
HENDLEY, supra note 23, at 19-20; BUTLER, supra note 57, at 73-75.
91. RmsANOvsKy, supra note 63, at 489.
92. Civil, Criminal and Land codes were promulgated in 1922. Codes of civil and criminal
procedure followed in 1923. A corrective labor code was ready in 1924. See FELDBRUGGE, supra note
85, at 96-97.
93. LESZEK KoLtaowsu, 2 MAIN CURRENTS OF MARXIM 491 (P.S. Fallah trans., Oxford
University Press 1978).
[Vol. 37
RULE OF LAW IN RUSSIA
law... The old law was quite persistent in the form of customary
law...,,94
But the reconstitution of a professional class of lawyers and the
replacement of revolutionary legal consciousness with codes largely
cribbed from continental European codes (including a draft civil code
under consideration by the Imperial State Duma in 1913 but dropped
shortly before World War I) still did not connote any interest in the
rule of law.95 The RSFSR Criminal Code adopted in 1922 rejected the
principle "no offense without law" in place of the principle of analogy:
"socially dangerous acts" not explicitly articulated as criminal could be
prosecuted by reference to offenses "similar in nature," thus giving the
regime great latitude to find an act criminal by comparison.96 The Civil
Code recognized no sphere in which the state could not intrude, and
every right was granted only insofar as it advanced the State's policies.
97
Pursuant to the Civil Code, transactions could be made null and void if
"directed to the obvious prejudice of the State."9 As Lenin saw it:
"[W]e must enlarge the interference of the State with the relations
pertaining to 'private law,' enlarge the right of the government to
annul, if necessary, 'private contracts' and to apply to private law
relations, not the corpus juris romani but our revolutionary concept of
law."99 Even legal capacity was only "granted" (not merely recognized)
by the state "[f] or the purpose of the development of the productive
forces of the country... ,"00 Thus, depending on the political mood,
the regime could disenfranchise any individual or group who exercised
rights in a manner viewed as contrary to the interests of the state.
Today's favored NEPman was tomorrow's kulak or social undesirable.
94. Gsovsmi, supra note 80, at 280.
95. On the derivative origins of NEP-era legal codes, see BERMAN, supra note 83, at 35; BUTLER,
supra note 57, at 4; Gsovsri, supra note 80, at 24-25.
96. Article 16 read "If any socially dangerous act has not been directly provided for by the
present Code, the basis and extent of liability for it is determined by applying to it those articles of
the code which deal with the offences most similar in nature." JOHNSON, supra note 86, at 39. See
also BERMAN, supra note 83, at 35. RSFSR refers to the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic,
the largest republic in the USSR union of the Soviet Socialist Republics.
97. Section One of the Civil Code of the same year made clear that' [t] he law protects private
rights except as they are exercised in contradiction to their social and economic purpose."
GsovsKI, supra note 80, at 315.
98. GSovSKi, supra note 80, at 28. Gsovski noted that, although other legal systems had
recognized precursors to this power (e.g. abus de droit, the unreasonable use of rights, in French
law), there existed no precedent for this extraordinary power of the Soviet state.
99. Id. at 28, 315-316.
100. Gsovssu, supra note 80, at 315.
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The law was a tool toward that determination, and no legal causeway
existed to provide a Soviet citizen with safe passage through changing
political temperaments.
The understanding of law as a weapon and a tool only grew stronger
after Lenin's death, Stalin's rise, the replacement of the NEP with
collectivization, the first "five-year plans," and the purges. The anarchy
and nihilism of revolutionary legality was replaced by an increasingly
conservative, legalistic, and bureaucratic regime. Lazar Kaganovich
articulated how ephemeral were the protections of law in late 1929:
"our laws are determined by revolutionary expediency at each particu-
lar moment."10 1 By 1936, however, Stalin famously declared the need
for the "stability of laws," by which Stalin sought to control a massive
centralized bureaucracy.
The rule of law was hardly the point of such a pronouncement. Law
was reduced to an administrative tool of total state control that could
be disregarded whenever advantageous for the state to do so. Those
civil liberties promised by the 1936 Constitution were limited (as the
1922 Civil Code had been limited) by the condition that rights were
exercised "in conformity with the interests of the working people, and
in order to strengthen the socialist system .... 12 What those interests
might be at any given moment was a matter of Party policy, and thus
always subject to change. In any event, Article 126 of the new Constitu-
tion for the first time formally recognized the Communist Party as "the
vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and
develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations
of the working people, both public and state." Even beyond the
privileging of the proletariat, there could be no equality before the law
in a state that constitutionally enshrined the superiority of Party
members, "the most active and politically most conscious citizens in the
ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people." 
1 03
Likewise, the protections of an independent and neutral judiciary
that the rule of law requires were completely absent from the system.
Courts lost most of their civil cases to state arbitration tribunals once
the private trade and small business previously permitted under the
NEP had again been oudawed.10 4 These tribunals resolved industrial
disputes that potentially threatened the all-important five-year plans,
101. BUTLER, supra note 57, at 74.
102. RiASANOVSKY, supra note 63, at 506 (quoting KONSTrriS1A S.S.S.R. OF 1936 [Constitu-
tion] ch. I (U.S.S.R.)).
103. KoNs~rrrusA S.S.S.R. OF 1936 [Constitution] art. 126 (U.S.S.R.).
104. JOHNSON, supra note 86, at 45.
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signaling that economic policy played a greater role in these cases than
the civil code. 105 The criminal law's ambit was similarly shrunk by the
regime's decision to keep all significant cases out of the courts and
under the control of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, the
NKVD. A 1934 special enactment granted the NKVD's "special boards"
the powers of a star chamber. Procedural due process was all but
eliminated: uncorroborated confessions had evidentiary force (and,
after 1937, could legally be obtained through torture), secret hearings
without counsel were the norm, and the burden of proof in cases of
counterrevolutionary crimes rested squarely on the shoulders of the
accused (who, inevitably, quickly became the convicted).106
If these legal weapons were not enough, the diktat of the Party
ensured that millions were executed or exiled into the gulags. The
Party not only drafted the general law, and selectively determined its
application, but also hand picked the judges trusted to apply it with
proper Soviet legal consciousness. Since one litmus test of a judge was
political reliability, those elevated to high positions on the bench
presumably supported the Party, accepted the importance of Party
unity, and followed the principles of democratic centralism and control
from above. This, along with rank fear, was the origin of the "telephone
justice" described by Solzhenitsyn and many others: "In his mind's eye
thejudge can always see the shiny black visage of truth - the telephone
in his chambers. This oracle will never fail you, as long as you do what it
says." 1
07
The worst abuses of the rule of law were rescinded in the years after
Stalin's death, but without any fundamental change in the instrumen-
talist view of law or its subordination to Party rule. Even the 1953 law
abolishing the "special boards" of the NKVD/MVD was not publicly
announced until 1955.108 In December 1959, the Supreme Soviet
adopted the "Basic Principles of Criminal Law and Criminal Proce-
dure," which, inter alia, abolished the principle of analogy and required
that criminal punishment be imposed only upon sentence by a court.109
This reform, however, did not entirely end the Orwellian practice of
renaming a crime or a punishment as an administrative measure. Thus,
while the state repealed its Stalinist bills of attainder (which made
orphans or exiles of the relatives of "enemies of the people," not as a
105. Gsovsyi, supra note 80, at 36.
106. JOHNSON, supra note 86, at 48-49.
107. ALEXANDER SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG ARCHIPELAGO, VOL. III 521 (1974).
108. JOHNSON, supra note 86, at 53.
109. Id. at 55.
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criminal punishment but as an administrative measure), an "anti-
parasite" law passed in 1961 provided for the summary and unappeal-
able "resettlement" for up to five years of those held to be avoiding
"socially useful work" and "leading an anti-social parasitic way of life."
No court was required to make such a finding, which could be
determined by a regular meeting of comrades at a factory or collective
farm with review by the local municipal council." 0 That same year, by
special decree of the Presidium, capital punishment was extended to
several economic crimes and retroactively applied to foreign currency
speculation."' Dissidents actually brought to trial by the state, as most
famously were Sinyavsky and Daniel in 1966, were classified as "political
cases" and thus exempted from the genuine reforms of due process
and other criminal procedural rights that were implemented under
Khrushchev and Brezhnev." 2 Such statutes and decrees bore little
relation to the principle of no offense without law.
The 1977 Constitution continued the privileged place of the Party
above the law. Article Six stated that the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union "shall be the guiding and directing force of Soviet society, the
core of its political system and of state and social organizations." This
article codified a direct infringement upon the independence of the
judiciary: in cases of interest to the Party, decision of the verdict and
sentence could be made by the Department of Administrative Organs
in the secretariat of the Party's Central Committee well before trial. As
one Moscow city procurator observed, "Party orders are law for the
procuracy, judges, and investigators."" 3 Brezhnev's constitution also
110. BERMAN, supra note 83, at 84-85.
111. Id. at 86.
112. ROBERT SHARLET, SOVIET CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS: FROM DE-STALINIZATION TO DISINTEGRA-
TION 29-30 (1992).
113. Peter H. Juviler, Some Trends in Soviet Criminal Justice, in 3 SOVIET LAW AFrER STALIN 59,
68-69 (Donald B. Barry, F.J.M. Feldbrugge, George Ginsburgs & Peter B. Maggs eds., 1979).
Frequency of interference was less important than the awareness of its omnipresent possibility. As
a former Czechoslovakian judge explained,
Only the insiders knew for sure whether or not the Party ran the courts. There was
neither total independence nor unqualified subordination. The practice of the ap-
paratchikivaried from leaving the judges entirely alone to drafting verdicts in the Party
Secretariats.... [Knowing someone] might at any time inflict his 'suggestion' upon us,
conditioned a/ our adjudication.
Robert Sharlet, The Communist Party and the Adminstration ofJustice in the USSR, in 3 SOVIET LAW
AFTER STALIN, supra, at 321, 332.
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continued the tradition of contingency to which civil rights had been
subjected since the Revolution. Article 59, for example, included the
admonishment that "[t]he exercise of rights and freedoms shall be
inseparable from the performance by a citizen of his duties." Aryeh
Unger has made the point that this clause "would seem to provide
blanket constitutional sanction for the deprivation of a right on grounds
of alleged dereliction of duty."'1 14 In any event, the Soviet lawyer could
never be confident that he knew all the relevant law necessary to
present his client's case. A morass of unrepealed or contradictory laws
were haphazardly published in various gazettes and newspapers, if
published at all; the Presidium still had the power to enact secret
laws.
115
C. The Rule of Law Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin
"During the last years of its life," Professor Bernard Rudden memora-
bly observed, "the Soviet Union turned to law like a dying monarch to
his withered God.... [T] he Congress and Supreme Soviet enact and
amend statutes with the fervor of one who sees in legislation the path to
paradise."1 16 Ironically, it was only in these death spasms that the state,
for the first time in Russian history, actively prioritized the develop-
ment of a npa~ooe aocyaapcmoo - a rule-of-law state. And the man
ushering in these reforms, Mikhail Gorbachev, was a lawyer by training
-the first lawyer to lead the Politburo since Lenin.
1 17
Gorbachev's economic policies of uskorenie (acceleration), khozraschet
(cost-accounting), and socialist competition prompted one of the most
important early changes in thinking about Soviet law. The success of
such policies was contingent on Soviet citizens who felt secure enough
in their rights to take advantage of these changes. In this context, then
Director of the Institute of State and Law and one of Gorbachev's
frequent advisors, Vladimir Kudriavtsev, wrote in December 1986: "Of
the two possible principles, 'You may do only what is permitted,' and
'You may do everything which is not forbidden,' priority should be
given to the latter inasmuch as it unleashes the initiative and activism of
114. ARYEH L. UNGER, CONSITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE U.S.S.R. 200 (1981).
115. BERMAN, supra note 83, at 235.
116. Rudden, supra note 27, at 17.
117. ARCHIE BROWN, THE GORBACHEV FACTOR 29 (1996). Brown characterizes the five years
Gorbachev spent at the MGU law faculty as "crucial ones for his intellectual development." Id. To
his credit, Gorbachev didn't last more than ten days at the Stavropol' procurator's office to which
he was assigned upon graduation from the law faculty at Moscow State University. Id. at 36.
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people."118 Gorbachev agreed wholeheartedly with the idea and soon
publicly reiterated it himself.1 9 Advocacy of such a principle, limiting
state action and expanding human liberty, was key to both perestroika
and to the creation of a system in which law was not a tool of the state
but a causeway for citizens. It was the nearest approximation to
acceptance of the rule-of-law maxim "no offense without law" in Russia
since before the Revolution.
Increasingly, Gorbachev promoted the construction of a cogaauc-
mutevoxe npa~oooe aocyaapcmao [sotsialisticheskoe pravovoe gosudarstvo], a
socialist rule-of-law state. 120 The Nineteenth Party Conference, held
June 28 -July 1, 1988, was a milestone for promoting a rule-of-law
state.' 21 In April 1988, Gorbachev prepared for the conference with a
series of meetings with regional party first secretaries. As Archie Brown
observed, Gorbachev "drew attention to the significance of moving to a
state based upon the rule of law, pointing out that this meant that every
person and all institutions must be subordinate to the law, including
the Politburo."122 In October 1988, Gorbachev asserted that this was
118. Vladimir Kudriavtsev, Pravovaia sistema: puti perestroiki, PRAVDA (Moscow), Dec. 5, 1986,
at 3.
119. Brown, supra note 117, at 145-46. The notion was explicitly incorporated into three early
and important pieces of economic legislation: the Law on Individual Labor Activity (1986), the
Law on the State Enterprise (1987), and the Law on Co-operatives (1988). Id. at 146.
120. Mikhail Gorbachev, 0 zadachakh partii po korennoi perestroike upravleniia ekonomiko,
Doklad na Plenume TsK KPSS, June 25, 1987, in 5 IZBRANNIE RECHI I STAT'! 183 (1988); Cherez
demokratizatsiiu - k novomu obliku sotsializma: Vstrecha v tsentral'nom Kommitete KPSS, PRAVDA (Mos-
cow), Oct. 24, 1988, at 1.
121. Mikhail Krasnov, The Rule of Law, in BETWEEN DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY: RUSSIAN
POST-COMMUNIST PoLTICAL REFoRM 195, 196-197 (Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov & Andrei
Ryabov, eds. 2004); SHARLET, supra note 112, at 106.
122. BROWN, supranote 117, at 176. Even at the height of his powers as General Secretary
(which Archie Brown pinpoints from the 19th Party Conference inJune 1988 to the First Congress
of People's Deputies in May 1989), political considerations still forced Gorbachev to leave the
conference commission on legal reform in the hands of Andrei Gromyko, then-Chairman of the
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and hardly a legal reformer. Id. at 177-79. Likewise, Gorbachev
was constrained to assign chairmanship of the Central Committee Commission for legal affairs to
former KGB chairman Chebrikov (according to Brown, "manifestly unfit to supervise any
transition to a law-governed state."). Id. at 186. These appointments should not be taken as signs of
Gorbachev's ambivalence about the goal of achieving a rule-of-law state. Rather, these were
tactically driven appointments forced upon Gorbachev by his own political vulnerabilities from
opponents of his emerging reform agenda. That Gorbachev and this agenda outlasted these
opponents (Gromyko retired in April 1989 and Chebrikov was dropped from the Politburo,
Secretariat, and his chairmanship of the legal commission in September 1989) is evidence
supporting the wisdom of these moves. Id. at 186. But see ROBERT B. AHDIEH, RUSSIA'S CONSTrrU-
TIONAL REVOLUTION: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY, 1985-1996, 36
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the key to perestroika, political reforms that he characterized as "a legal
revolution. " 12 By 1991, the advocacy of a "law-governed civil society" -
npaaooe apa-lcaaficaoe o6u4ecmao [pravovoe grazhdanskoe obshchestvo] -
was sufficiently uncontroversial to be demanded even within the pages
of the legal journals that had previously denounced the concept's
bourgeois roots and predicted the withering away of law altogether.124
Gorbachev also promoted the increasing influence of transnational
legal systems on Soviet legal norms. The 1989 Law on Constitutional
Supervision, for the first time in Soviet history, "provided a mechanism
for the direct incorporation of various international rules into the
Soviet domestic legal system." 125 The law gave a Committee on Consti-
tutional Supervision the power to review Soviet law for compliance with
USSR international legal obligations. In the few years of its operation,
the Committee issued decisions challenging criminal law norms on the
presumption of innocence, residency permits, and the limited jurisdic-
tion of Soviet courts regarding labor disputes. These and other cases
relied on citation to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Boris Yeltsin's presidency
was marked by evidence of how dramatic a conceptual shift in thinking
about law had been accomplished by Gorbachev's reforms, and also
how shallow were the roots of that new thinking. Tremendous advances
were made for the development of rule of law as a causeway. Foremost
of these was the adoption and entry into force of the first two parts (of
three) of a new Civil Code, in 1995 and 1996 respectively. Drawing on
the sea change in legal thinking launched under Gorbachev, the Civil
Code was premised on the principle that "what is not prohibited, is
permitted."1 26 Through this Code, entrepreneurs and individual citi-
zens were provided the framework to contract and otherwise secure
their property and relations with each other to a degree not previously
known in Russian history. And beyond the requirement that civil law
rights be exercised in good faith, without infringing the rights of others
(1997) ("Gorbachev opened a Pandora's box by singing the praises of the law and the constitu-
tion, yet continuing to use them not as arbiters of the process but as tools within it.").
123. Interv'iu M.S. Gorbacheva zhurnalu "Shpigel" (FRG), PRAVDA (Moscow), Oct. 24, 1988, at 1.
124. Rudden, supra note 27, at 17 n.3 (citing Chairman of the USSR Constitutional
Supervision Committee S.S. Alekseev's article Pravo: vremia novykh podkhodov, SOVETSKOE Gosu-
DARSTVO iPRAvo, No. 2,3,8 (1991)).
125. Gennady M. Danilenko, International Law and the Future of Rechtstaat in Russia, in Smith &
Danilenko, supra note 45, at 96, 98.
126. BTrrLER, supra note 57, at 364.
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or creating a danger of harm to them, the Civil Code left the Russian
citizen unencumbered by the teleological restrictions of the Soviet past
that rendered the citizen's rights contingent on the state's satisfaction
with the fulfillment of his duties.
Nevertheless, Yeltsin and his administration repeatedly discovered
just how difficult it was to translate these new concepts of law into their
institutional practice. This was partly due to Yeltsin's own difficulty in
accepting constraints on his executive power, which a rule-of-law state
necessarily imposed on him. One of Yeltsin's legal advisors for much of
the 1990s, Mikhail Krasnov, recounts how Yeltsin, editing remarks that
had been prepared for him, changed a statement in it that the state
should be bound by law to read "the state should be bound with the
law." To Krasnov, the choice of preposition made all the difference:
"Clearly, this small preposition radically altered the definition of law-
governed state, implying that the law reflects the tendencies of the state
and is used to justify its actions instead of acting as an independent
constraint."
12 7
Yeltsin's actions in office also exposed his difficulty in coming to
terms with rule-of-law constraints. For example, as the RF Constitu-
tional Court prepared to decide a case challenging the constitutionality
of the President's ban on the Communist Party, Yeltsin, by secret
decree, raised the salaries of thejudges empanelled to hear the case. 128
Both the secrecy of his act and its obvious attempt to interfere in the
work of thejudiciary were contrary to the rule of law. Similarly, when in
February 1994 the newly constituted Russian parliament used its new
power of amnesty to release from prison the leaders of the October
1993 attempted coup, Yeltsin telephoned General Procurator Kazannik
to demand that he find a way to keep Yeltsin's enemies in prison.
Rather than ignore the lawful order of the legislature, Kazannik
promptly resigned rather than be a party to what he rightly denounced
as an attempt to return to the days of "telephone justice."
Of course, Yeltsin was far from alone in being unable to put his
public support for the rule of law into action. The tax code and
extraordinarily high rates imposed on profits were prime examples of
laws that imposed duties impossible to perform. Thus, the tax codes
made virtually every serious entrepreneur a scofflaw. The propiska
system of residency permits, although decisively held unconstitutional
by the Constitutional Court, continued to be enforced in Moscow and
127. Krasnov, supra note 121, at 198.
128. Rudden, supra note 27, at 17, 29.
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other urban areas that attracted hopeful but homeless citizens. It little
helped a Caucasian trader in Moscow to inform his arresting officer
that the law permitted his freedom of movement. The tax inspectorate,
like the Moscow Mayor's Office, used these laws (even those held
unconstitutional and therefore no longer law) as tools to extract rents,
whether from would-be entrepreneurs or merely desperately poor
internal immigrants.
Law was used as a tool between politicians at higher levels of power,
too. According to one scholar and early member of the Russian
democratic opposition,
... while arguing for the rule of law or a law-based state,
'democrats' saw law as a means of toppling the regime, as a tool
that should have been directed mainly against their Communist
opponents, while they themselves did not feel bound by what
they considered to be outdated and unjust Communist laws. 129
Soviet legal study had for years been steeped in the basic principles
of Marxism-Leninism (e.g. law as an instrument of class domination),
dialectical materialism (including the forecast withering away of all law
and state administration) and the history of the Communist Party. All
the while, Russian lawyers were starved of serious study of comparative
law, constitutionalism, and federalism. The Soviet lawyer, "whether he
be a convinced Marxist-Leninist or not, of whatever disposition, his
concepts of law, its origins, role, and purpose, have been affected by
this intellectual framework."1 30 As Vasily Vlasihin, the head of U.S.
Legal Studies at the Institute of the USA and Canada observed with
some prescience at a conference held in January 1993, "all too many
people in Russia think that once you get the right statutes on the books,
you automatically create an operative rule of law. But Russians still do
not trust law itself."13 1 Firmly embedded in the public consciousness
remained that old Russian saying that contrasts starkly with both the
rule of law and the metaphor of law as a causeway: "3aaoH KaK abW a -
129. Alexander Lukin, Democratic Groups in Soviet Russia (1985-1991): A Study in Political
Culture 323 (1997) (unpublished D.Phil. thesis, University of Oxford) (on file with University of
Oxford and British Library). See also ALEXANDER LUKN, THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF THE RussIAN
'DEMoCRATS' 204-10 (2000).
130. W.E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW 27 (2nd ed. 1988).
131. Vasily A. Vlasihin, Toward a Rule of Law and a Bill of Rights for Russia, in Smith &
Danilenko, supra note 45, at 43, 46.
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Kyaa noepnaya, myaa U GbZIuA0."132
This mentality remained largely unreconstructed even as the institu-
tional manifestations of new legal institutions sprang up like mush-
rooms while Russia fought for membership in the Council of Eu-
rope. 133 The moratorium placed on the death penalty in 1996, for
example, is a direct result of this transnational law. Accession to the
Council of Europe was contingent, in part, on Yeltsin's ability to end
the use of the death penalty. Yeltsin did so by presidential decree
(ukaz), but was unable or unwilling to push the Duma for ratification of
the ECHR Protocol that would have permanently abolished capital
punishment in Russia.
These attitudinal barriers were apparent in several other areas of the
rule of law. On the eve of its acceptance, legal experts from the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe concluded that
"[t] he courts can now be considered structurally independent from the
executive, but the concept that it should in the first place be for the
judiciary to protect the individuals has not yet become a reality in
Russia." 134 Two years later, the situation had little improved:
[T] he mentality towards the law has not yet changed. In Soviet
times, laws could be completely disregarded - party politics and
"telephone justice" reigned supreme. While it cannot be said
that laws are ignored as a matter of course in present times, they
are disregarded if a "better" solution to a particular problem
seems to present itself. This assertion is valid for every echelon
of the Russian state administration, from the President of the
Federation... down to local officials.... [I] t is very difficult to
enforce the law through the courts. Often, a complaint against
administrative abuse cannot even be brought to court, since the
prosecutor's office is the competent state organ. But even when
such cases are brought to court, and the court rules against the
administration, the decision is sometimes not implemented
132. Id.
133. For a more in-depth analysis of this transnational influence on Russian law, see Jeffrey
Kahn, Russian Compliance with Articles Five and Six of the European Convention of Human Rights as a
Barometer of Legal Reform and Human Rights in Russia, 35 U. MiCH.J.L. REFoRM 641 (2002).
134. Rudolf Bernhardt, Stefan Trechsel, Albert Weitzel, & Felix Ermacora, Report on the
Conformity of the Legal Order of the Russian Federation with Council of Europe Standards, Doc.
AS/Bur/Russia (1994), reprinted in 15 HuM. RTs. L.J. 250, 287 (1994). In fact, given the continued
oversight of the judiciary by the executive branch Ministry of Justice for another two years,
structural "independence from the executive" may itself have been an unduly optimistic conclu-
sion.
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due to the low standing courts and their decisions enjoy in
public opinion.
135
Even something seemingly so uncontestable as the publication of
supreme court opinions was surprisingly suspect to leading members of
the Russian federal judiciary. It is worth repeating at length the
recollections of Frank Douglas Wagner, for the past eighteen years the
Reporter of Decisions for the United States Supreme Court, of a visit to
the United States in spring 1993 of Valerii Zorkin, then chairman of the
RF Constitutional Court:
Near the end of our discussion, after we had parsed the ins and
outs of preparing and publishing court opinions, Chairman
Zorkin asked me a final question. It nearly threw me for a loop
when he inquired: "How do you keep the press and your
enemies from lying about what you've decided in important
cases?" As I understood it, the Chairman was not simply asking
whether or how the Supreme Court tries to dissuade its critics
from putting unwarranted spin on its rulings. Rather, he seemed
to be asking the much more basic question of how we defend
ourselves against bald-faced liars bent on distorting our work in
order to destroy the Court's credibility and, thus, its effective-
ness as a functioning arm of Government. The question was so
astonishing to someone raised in the western democratic tradi-
tion that it took me several moments to arrive at the answer.
Finally, a light dawned. I told Chairman Zorkin that what we do
is disseminate our decisions as promptly and as widely as
possible through a variety of print and electronic media so that
those interested can quickly and easily determine for them-
selves what the Court has ruled on a particular question. Since
the Chairman's visit, I have come to believe that public access to
the Court's decisions, no matter what the medium or source, is
one of the bearings that keeps democracy's wheels turning
true. 1
3 6
The Yeltsin era was a mlange of extraordinarily rapid statutory
reform of Russia's civil, political, economic, and legal institutions and
135. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, Opinion on Russia's
Application for Membership of the Council of Europe, Doc. 7463 (Jan. 18, 1996), reprinted in HuM. RTS.
L.J., Oct. 15, 1996, at 218-19.
136. Naseem Stecker, Reflections of a Modern Scribe, 84 MICH. B.J. 2, Feb. 2005,41.
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painfully slow reform of attitudes and norms of behavior in each of
those spheres. This laid the path for many of the problems ultimately
faced in the Putin administration. Many of the shallow institutional
roots of the rule of law set down in the first short decade of post-Soviet
Russian politics were easily uprooted in the second decade.
IV. THE RuLE OF LAW IN PUTIN's RussiA
How does President Vladimir Putin's stated intention to establish a
"dictatorship of law" correspond to the RF Constitution's assertion of
the existence of the rule of law? 137 In this regard, I do not intend to
catalog the full slate of Putin's activities, reformist as often as reaction-
ary, which task would require a book-length analysis. But what high-
lights would such a treatment include? How does law in Putin's Russia
rate against the three principles of the rule of law discussed above: no
offense without law, equality before the law, and the independence of
the judiciary to enforce the law?
In his public statements, Putin seems at least able to articulate the
concept of the rule of law. In his state-of-the-nation address this past
April, for example, Putin insisted that the laws governing property
rights "should be clear to all... [and] they should be stable." 13" His
rationale tracked those aspects of the rule of law that are highlighted by
the metaphor of the law as a causeway: "This allows anyone developing
their own enterprise properly to plan and conduct both their business
and their life. It allows citizens calmly and without anxiety to conclude
contracts in such vital areas as, for example, buying a home, or
privatizing it."1 39 Putin even seemed to recognize what Professor Rud-
den described as the precious sphere of non-law, accepting limits on
137. Putin introduced this phrase early in his first presidential campaign, see Open Letter
from Vladimir Putin to Russia's Voters, 25 Feb. 2000, available at http://putin2000.ru/07/
05.html. Putin used the phrase repeatedly during his first term as president. See, e.g., Russian
Public TV, Moscow, in Russian (broadcast May 17,2000, 1700 GMT), available from BBC Worldwide
Monitoring, http://news.bbc.co.uk; "Vladimir Putin: Vlast' dolzhna byt' rabotaiushchei!" Rossi-
ISKAYA GAZETA (May 19, 2000) at 3; Russian Public TV, Moscow, in Russian (broadcastJuly 8, 2000,
0800 GMT), available from BBC Worldwide Monitoring, http://news.bbc.co.uk.
138. Vladimire Putin, Address, in Russian (RTR Russia TV, Moscow, broadcast Apr. 5, 2005,
08:00 GMT) (transcript available from BBC Worldwide Monitoring). In some cases, Putin's
historical references to the development of the rule of law, as well as other fundamental social
institutions, veers into sheer fantasy: "For three centuries, together with other European nations,
hand in hand with them, we have gone through a process of enlightenment and experienced
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the state's power, identifying areas of life in which he contended that
the state had no business to interfere. 140 Putin also made a hallmark of
his first term the harmonization of federal and regional law, with a
tremendous gain for Russia in terms of a more predictable, transpar-
ent, and ascertainable legal hierarchy.1 4 ' Early in his first term, the
third and final part of the Civil Code entered into force, and the long
embattled Criminal Procedural Code was passed into law.
But continuing developments during Putin's presidency have ex-
posed reactionary undercurrents not very deep below the surface. One
of the most notable sources of retrenchment is Putin's antiterrorism
initiative. The reintroduction of juries, for example, infuriated the
security services, law enforcement, and even judges. Despite the fact
thatjuries have only been available to the accused in all but two regions
of Russia since last year, the acquittal rate forjury trials hovers at about
fifteen per cent, similar to rates in other European countries that
employ juries. 142 But just as Tsar Alexander II introduced the jury
system only to exempt more and more political cases from jury trials as
the independence of that institution challenged the state's power,
Putin's administration has engaged in the same reactionary retrench-
ment. Beyond their efforts to slow the rate at which juries are intro-
duced into Russia, the security services have actively sought to exempt
terrorism and espionage cases from trial by jury, asserting the need to
protect state secrets from public disclosure. 143 As with jury. trials, the
140. Id. ("The great Russian philosopher Ivan Ilyin wrote that the power of state has its own
limits, determined by the very fact that it is a power that suits the external life of an individual.
However, all the [internal] creative states of the soul and spirit, including love, freedom and
goodwill, are not under the jurisdiction of the state and cannot be dictated by it. The state cannot
demand the trust, blessing, love, goodness and faith of its citizens. It cannot regulate scientific,
religious and artistic works. It must not meddle in moral, family and everyday life or, unless
absolutely essential, stifle the people's economic initiative and creativity. Let us not forget this.").
141. See, e.g., Gordon M. Hahn, The Impact of Putin's Federative Reforms on Democratization in
Russia, 19 POsT-SovIET AFF. 114, 117 (2003). See also KAHN, supra note 4, at 245-52.
142. Between 1993 and 2003, only pilot programs were permitted in nine regions; in 2003,
sixty regions were added. Marjorie Farquharson, After One Year, New Russian Criminal Procedure Code
is Showing Results, 7 RFE/RL NEWSUNE, July 31, 2003, http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/rferl/
2003/03-07-31.rferl.html#83. Chechnya and Ingushetia are not slated for the introduction ofjury
trials until 2007. Bench trials produce acquittals roughly one to two per cent of the time. Fred
Weir, Russia Embraces Trial By Peers, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Mar. 5, 2003; Matt Bivens, A Glum
Report Card on Russia, Moscow TIMES,June 2,2003, available athttp://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/
7205-3.cfm. The acquittal rate for all trials is 0.4%. The European average is roughly ten per cent.
Farquharson, supra.
143. Mark Kramer, Out of Communism: Reforming the Russian Legal System, 102 CuRRENT HIST.
327, 331-32 (2003).
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Putin administration has grown increasingly restless with the morato-
rium placed on the death penalty during the Yeltsin administration.
This year, Deputy Procurator General Vladimir Kolesnikov advocated
that those convicted of terrorism charges be exempted from the
protections of the moratorium.'4
As with his past use of his catchphrase "the dictatorship of law,"
Putin's descriptions of fundamental legal principles are often tinged
with a darker double meaning. In his state-of-the-nation speech, Putin
intoned, "Firstly, only in a free and just society does every law-abiding
citizen have the right to demand for himself reliable legal guarantees
and state protection."' 45 For Putin, the citizen is entitled to legal
guarantees, but only after the conclusion is reached that he is a
"law-abiding" citizen. But the rule of law requires legal protections to
be universally and equally applied precisely because those suspected or
accused of violating the law are those most in need of reliable legal
guarantees for their rights.
Likewise, Putin insisted that " [t] he inviolability of the right to private
property is the basic requirement for the conduct of any kind of
business. The rules to which the state adheres in this field should be
clear to all." All fair enough as far as that goes, but only moments prior
to insisting on the inviolability of property Putin enjoyed a celebratory
reference to "[h]aving liberated the largest mass media outlets from
censorship by oligarchs." 46 Such an Orwellian reference to the politi-
cally directed criminal investigations that drove Vladimir Gusinsky and
Boris Berezovsky to flee their country and lose their media empires
leaves one to wonder how many more such "liberations" will be
permitted under Putin's understanding of inviolable private property
rights.
The Gusinsky episode, in particular, provides striking evidence of the
Putin administration's disregard for two of the rule-of-law principles
described above: the principle of no offense without law and the
principle of equality before the law. Gusinsky's Media-Most empire was
"liberated" from him because debt renegotiations failed with the
state-controlled gas giant Gazprom. 147 Gusinsky spent four days in
police custody on dubious charges before he bought his freedom by
signing under duress an agreement to give up his majority stake in his
144. Jan Sliva, Council of Europe Criticizes Russia's Human Rights Record, Commitment to Democracy,
AssociATo PRESS,June 3, 2005.
145. See BBC Monitoring transcript of address taken from RTR Russia TV, supra note 138.
146. Id.
147. Russia: The Very LongArm of Its Law, THE ECONOMIsT, Dec. 16, 2000.
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media holdings company to Gazprom. The arrangement was brokered
by none other than the Acting Press Minister, Mikhail Lesin, who gave
Gusinsky his ultra vires assurance that in exchange for Gusinsky's
signature transferring assets to Gazprom, the criminal investigation of
him would be dropped. In words that, given their context, foreshad-
owed Putin's recent doublespeak about the rule of law, the agreement
Gusinsky signed while sitting in the notorious Butyrka prison stated:
"The Parties realise that successful implementation of the Agreement is
possible only when individuals and legal entities acquire and exercise
their civil rights of their own free will and in their own interests, without
compulsion by any other party to act in any particular way."' 148
This utter hypocrisy, and a second warrant for his arrest, led Gusinsky
to file an application with the European Court of Human Rights. The
European Court found that Gusinsky's arrest violated the rule of law
requirement embodied in the Convention that Russian criminal law
cannot be used as a tool to advance the state's ulterior political or
commercial purposes. 149 Gusinsky's case illustrates Putin's view of law
as a tool of the state, compared with the European Court's detailed
opinion advancing a conception of the rule of law much closer to the
metaphor of a causeway. Gusinsky, under this latter and better view, was
entitled to rely on the law both in his private civil law dealings with
Gazprom and in securing himself against deprivation of his liberty by
the state.
The principle of equality before the law has also not fared well under
Putin, although that flaw can hardly be said to have originated in his
administration. Oligarchs are not the only citizens endangered by the
state's use of law as a tool. Outspoken journalists, lawyers, and dissi-
dents who challenge the state have found themselves charged with
crimes in retaliation. The environmentalist and former militaryjournal-
ist Grigorii Pasko, himself a victim of retaliatory treason charges that
remained secret throughout his closed-door trial, has described a
certain "utnuonai-iua" [shpionomania - spy-mania] that has gripped
148. Gusinskiy v. Russia, App. No. 70276/01 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 22, 2004) 28, available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/echr (follow "Case-Law" hyperlink; then follow "HUDOC" hyperlink;
then search Application Number 70276/01; then follow "Reports ofJudgment" hyperlink).
149. Id. at 76 ("[I]t is not the purpose of such public-law matters as criminal proceedings
and detention on remand to be used as part of commercial bargaining strategies. The fact that
Gazprom asked the applicant to sign the July agreement when he was in prison, that a State
Minister endorsed such an agreement with his signature and that a State investigating officer later
implemented that agreement by dropping the charges strongly suggest that the applicant's
prosecution was used to intimidate him.").
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Putin's cuooucu [siloviki - members of the security and military ser-
vices] - an obsession with ferreting out spies imagined to fill the ranks
of citizens.150 There is former FSB Lt. Col. Mikhail Trepashkin, now an
attorney who represented victims seeking state compensation after the
1999 Moscow apartment bombings only to find himself detained on
highly suspicious firearms charges a week before he announced his
intent to demonstrate the state's complicity in the bombings in open
court. 5 1 He was ultimately sentenced to four years in prison, with an
added charge for revealing state secrets. 152 These names can be added
to those of Alexander Nikitin, Igor Sutyagin, Valentin Danilov, and
many others who have been accused of espionage based on a law on
state secrets and sometimes for the use of sources only subsequently
classified as protected secrets. Sometimes the charges themselves have
been partially kept from the accused on grounds of state secrecy.
This Article has not addressed the total legal vacuum that has existed
in Chechnya since at least December 1994. The egregious violations of
human rights there, and the sheer volume of violations, are enough to
make anyone question Russia's assertion to be a rule-of-law state. There
are also specific reasons to fear how the Chechen wars have retarded
the development of the rule of law in the rest of the country. The
episodic terrorism that these wars have sparked - the Nord-Ost hostage
crisis, apartment bombings, and Beslan massacre the best known
among them - has led to the sort of emergency legislation thatjustifies
extraordinary police tactics in the name of fighting terrorism. As the
Moscow Helsinki Group has observed, as well, Chechnya is also a
proving ground for police who "share in the experiences of violence,
lawlessness and absolute impunity," and then return to their precincts
"and take these practices with them."1 5
The independence of the judiciary, the third principle discussed
above, is the most concrete institutional representation of the three
rule-of-law principles I've outlined. Putin has done much to improve
the administration of the law in Russia by generally supporting indepen-
150. Fred Weir, Russian Government Sets Sights On 'Subversion', CHRISTAN Sci. MoNrOR, June 1,
2005.
151. Alex Rodriguez, Verdict Near on Sleuth Who Talked Too Much, CHI. TRIB., May 18, 2004, at 4.
152. Kim Murphy, Russian Ex-Agent's Sentencing Called Political, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 2004;
Victor Yasmann, Court Sentences Ex-FSB Officerfor Disclosure of State Secrets, RFE/RL NEWSLNE, May
20, 2004, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2004/O5/2O0504.asp; Anatoly Medetsky, FSB Critic Trepa-
shkinJailedfor 4 Years, Moscow ThMsS, May 20, 2004, available at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/
8215-3.cfm.
153. Bivens, supra note 142 (quoting Tanya Lokshina, executive director of the Moscow
Helsinki Group).
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dent courts, trained jurists to preside over them, and a vibrant bar to
attract citizens to use the courts to resolve disputes and trust in their
impartiality in criminal matters. Putin has increased the salaries of
judges and law enforcement personnel, and he has called for more
funding for the courts. 154 These efforts have their origin, in part, in
Putin's foreign policy goals of closer ties to Europe (e.g. Council of
Europe) and the international legal order (e.g. the World Trade
Organization, and the G-8 Group of Industrial Nations). They are also
part of Putin's inheritance from the Yeltsin administration. Putin has
found himself repeatedly pressed, as was his predecessor, to meet the
demands of Russia's membership in the Council of Europe.
The Criminal Procedure Code, which was passed into law in Novem-
ber-December 2001, radically modernized Soviet practices that con-
fiated executive and judicial branch roles in the administration of
justice. Under the Soviet-era Code, whether to detain a suspect
(noOaope~aettbZU) or an accused person (o6unetbU) was a decision
entirely in the province of the prosecutor, not the judge. The new Code
takes away this extraordinary executive power and requires a court of
law to make the determination whether to issue a warrant for the arrest
of an individual or the search of his property. Justice Ministry statistics
indicated that courts released three thousand suspects during the first
three months of the Code's operation, a thousand more than the entire
previous calendar year. 1
55
But despite what such relatively encouraging figures might suggest,
these provisions have met with resistance from every level of the
Russian state. 156 Russian lawmakers were themselves aware how diffi-
cult a change this would be for prosecutors to accept. They therefore
154. Andrei Malosolov, Russian Prime Minister Sums Up First Results of Judicial Reform, RIA-
NovosTi, Jan. 21, 2003; Julie A. Corwin, Putin Calls For More Funding for Court System, RFE/RL
NEWSLiNE, Nov. 29, 2000, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2000/11/281100.asp. Many regional
governments, however, still provide local judges their housing and other bonuses, obviously
compromising their independence.
155. Farquharson, supra note 142. Farquharson cites these statistics as also indicating a 50%
reduction in arrests in general, and an ongoing average of courts releasing detainees roughly 10%
of the time.
156. See, e.g., Julie A. Corwin,Judges Cast Their Vote Against Judicial Reforms, RFE/RL REPORTS,
Mar. 19, 2001, http://www.rferl.org/reports/rpw/2001/03/9-190301.asp (reporting opposition
to arrest and search warrant requirements from Prosecutor-General Vladimir Ustinov, Interior
Minister Vladimir Rushailo, and FSB Head Nikolai Patrushev, leading Putin to withdraw initial
proposal in January 2001); Julie A. Corwin, Putin Backs 'Liberal' Amendments to Criminal Code,
RFE/RL REPORTS, Apr. 2, 2001, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2001/04/1-rus/rus-020401.asp
(reporting revival ofjudicial warrant proposal but resistance to implementation prior to 2003).
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sought to delay this element of the Code eighteen months after the rest
of the Code entered into force in July 2001. Although the RF Constitu-
tional Court struck down that transitional period, that did not end the
resistance. 157 This demonstrates thatjust as important as these specific
provisions is the "ethos of restraint" that underlies them and that they
are intended to promote.' It is in this area thatjudicial independence
is the weakest and in which Putin appears to have had the least success
and the least political interest in achieving a change from the status quo.
Decades of deference to prosecutors, themselves working under the
eye of the Party, has evaporated the sense of institutional indepen-
dence among many judges. 5 9 Other institutional forces also put pres-
sures on judges and threaten the independence of a politically neutral
judiciary. For example, although the Criminal Procedure Code shifts
the burden of proof to the state in criminal cases, the prosecution is still
entitled to appeal criminal acquittals. In 2002, approximately 40% of
acquittals were reversed by higher courts, as compared to 0.05% of
convictions reversed on appeal. 160 This high rate of success for prosecu-
157. 0 proverke konstitutsionnosti statei 90, 96, 122, i 216 Ugolovno-protsessual'nogo
kodeksa RSFSR v sviazi s zhalobami grazhdan S.S. Malenkina, R.N. Martynova i S.V. Pustovalova
(Mar. 14, 2002), available at http://ks.rfnet.ru/pos/p6_02.htm. See also Ger P. van den Berg,
Constitution of the Russian Federation Annotated with Summaries of Rulings and Other Decisions of
Constitutional (Charter) Courts: 1990-2001, 27 REv. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 175 (2001). Ger P. van den
Berg, Constitutional Court: A Decade of Legal Reforms - Part 2: The Constitution of the Russian Federation
Annotated, 28 REv. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 273 (2002-3).
158. Kramer, supra note 143, at 327 ("Although the code's specific guidelines are crucial,
even more important is the ethos of restraint that develops over time as the key participants in a
criminal justice system learn to play by the rules of the game.").
159. According to Sergei Vitsin, a law professor and deputy chair of the Presidential Council
on the Reform of the Justice System, "Judges do not see themselves as in any way separate from
prosecutors and police. You can write democratic laws, but you have to follow them, too." Peter
Finn, Fear Rules in Russia's Courtrooms:Judges Who Acquit Forced Off Bench, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2005,
at Al. An experienced Moscow prosecutor, Sergei Tsirkun, confirmed this view:
Judges think of themselves as soldiers in the front line fighting crime. A judge is not
going to pass an acquittal unless he is absolutely, 100 percent confident that someone is
innocent. If he has the slightest suspicion that someone might be guilty, he will find
them guilty even if he has to ignore problems with the evidence.
Id
160. Kramer, supra note 143, at 328 (citing formerjudge Sergei Pashin of the Independent
Council of Legal Experts for this statistic). Yurii Skuratov, RF General Procurator at the time of his
remarks, defended the practice as a means "to supervise the legality of the proceedings by
appealing against sentences and rulings.... By making the court take lawful, fair decisions, the
Prokuratura effectively serves to establish the court's authority and independence." Yuri Skuratov,
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tors on appeal creates subtle institutional pressures on lower court
judges. Because the percentage of rulings overturned by higher courts
is one of the key criteria by which lower court judges are evaluated for
advancement, lower courtjudges face pressures to "err[] on the side of
guilty verdicts" to conform to the preferences such statistics repre-
sent. 161 Such a behavioral shift can be expected to be even more
difficult for the prosecutors driving this trend than for the judges
meekly reacting to it.
These statistics point to a recurring theme in Russian history: reform
from above is never enough. As Soviet era laws continue to be replaced
by generally improved post-Soviet legislation, the reform of institu-
tional cultures, old methods, and mindsets remains even more difficult
and less has been accomplished. 162 The opposition of the cu.aoouicu
[siloviki] is taken for granted. Even as the KGB morphed into the FSB,
the persistence of the old slang term 'iexucmb [chekisty] that originated
with the VCheKa remains standard usage - it is not expected that the
sword and shield, the symbol of the states security organ, will be
replaced in the same way as the hammer and sickle. Unlike the
countries of Eastern Europe, no lustration process occurred in Russia,
nor is one to be expected at this late stage. This behavioral legacy of the
Soviet past, as the experience in reforming the Criminal Procedure
Code suggests, is no less an obstacle to the establishment of the rule of
law than structural reform. This is because the greatest abuses of the
rights and processes to which citizens are entitled when confronted by
the criminal justice system monolith occur not in the mansion of the
court, but at the gatehouse of the police precinct. 163 It is at the earliest
Conceptual Questions Relating to the Development of the Prokuratura In the Period of Law Reform In the
Russian Federation, in THE PROKURATURA IN A STATE GOVERNED BY THE RULE OF LAw (Multilateral
Meeting Organized by the Council of Europe in Conjunction with the General Prosecutor's Office
of the Russian Federation, Moscow, 8-9 January 1997) 16 (Council of Europe Pub., April 1998).
Skuratov's Orwellian view of the source ofjudicial independence evinced absolutely no understand-
ing of the separation ofjudicial and executive authority.
161. Kramer, supra note 143, at 328. For recent anecdotal evidence of this pressure, see Finn,
supra note 159. See also Robert Coalson, Former Judge Appeals to Putin on Judicial Independence,
RFE/RL NEWSLINE, Mar. 14, 2005, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2005/03/140305.asp; Jeremy
Page,Judges Take Stand Against Putin, TIMES (UK), Mar. 19, 2005; Guy Chazan, In Russia's Courts, A
Judge Speaks Up - And Gets Fired, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 2004, at Al; Douglas Birch, In Russian Trials,
"Not Guilty" Often Is Not An Option, BALT. SuN,June 13, 2004, at IA.
162. SeeJ. Michael Waller, Police, Secret Police, and Civil Authority, in Sachs & Pistor, supra note
77, at 95, 97-98, 109.
163. I borrow these metaphors of the mansion and the gatehouse from their more common
usage in the context of studies of American criminal procedure, and especially by Professor Yale
Kamisar. As Professor Kamisar famously observed:
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moments that a person comes under suspicion, is placed under arrest,
or subject to interrogation, that observance of his legal rights matters
most.
Civil law is not immune to these problems. The entrepreneur kept in
a constant state of anxiety by the state's use of law as a tool is hardly to
be expected to adopt a causeway mentality in his dealings with competi-
tors and clients. What Kathryn Hendley has labeled a lack of reciprocity
in legal relations is really nothing more than the failure to adopt a
perspective on law based on its use as a causeway and not as a weapon.
Commenting on her field research on how Russian firms use litigation
to secure payments by debtors, Hendley observed a "come-and-get-me"
attitude displayed by firms with regard to their own debt obligations
coupled with simultaneous frustration with their own customer's debts
to them. These seemingly irreconcilable attitudes suggest the interplay
between a difficult economic environment, a weak state, and attitudes
toward the rule of law:
For some reason, they seemed unable to connect the dots to see
that this lack of reciprocity within the system was crippling it.
No state can afford to enforce every single judgment of its
courts affirmatively. The civil system works because most liti-
gants pay voluntarily. The willingness to pay is motivated by a
desire to avoid community censure and by a fear of the coercive
power of the state. In post-Soviet Russia, reputational sanctions
for not paying debts have been slow to develop. The widespread
nature of the economic crisis has given rise to a business culture
in which non-payment has become the rule rather than the
exception. As a result, the burden on the state to affirmatively
In the 'gatehouse' of American criminal procedure - through which most defendants
journey and beyond which many never get - the enemy of the state is a depersonalized
'subject' ... 'game' to be stalked and cornered. Here ideals are checked at the door,
'realities' faced, and the prestige of law enforcement vindicated. Once he leaves the
'gatehouse' and enters the 'mansion' - if he ever gets there - the enemy of the state is
repersonalized, even dignified, the public invited, and a stirring ceremony in honor of
individual freedom from law enforcement celebrated.
Yale Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions ofAmerican Criminal Procedure: From PoweU
to Gideon, from Escobedo to.... in CRIMINALJUSTICE IN OUR TIME 1 (A.E. Dick Howard, ed., 1965),
quoted in George C. Thomas III, Missing Miranda's Story, 2 OHIO ST.J. CRIM. L. 677, 682-83 (2005).
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enforce civil judgments is unusually high, and the state has
staggered under the burden.1
64
As Hendley observes in a footnote, this attitude is a legacy of the
Soviet-era expectation "to get around ('oboyti') the rules" rather than
apply them for both protection against the claims of others and
enforcement of ones' own claims. 165 In other words, the Soviet legal
system did not provide a causeway for citizens, and none has magically
appeared in the consciousness of post-Soviet Russian businessmen.
In a throwback to the tsarist maintenance of the formal illegality
against cartels and syndicates to ensure their obedience to the state,
Putin's Russia has maintained bankruptcy laws with extremely low
requirements for the minimum size of the debt and the period of time
in arrears before bankruptcy proceedings may be started against the
debtor. The law has been used by competitor businesses as a tool for
financial and political gain. The law works here as a tool and not as a
causeway, because of the state's involvement. Just like the tsarist ability
to "seize a random victim" via its cartel laws, corrupt regional govern-
ments can throw their weight to influence the choice of receiver for the
competitor-declared-bankrupt: "It]he targeted company would then
fall under the control of a court-appointed manager, who frequently
looted the company or turned it over to a competitor." 166 Unlike the
tsarist system, however, the state may find itself not the lead actor but
the foil in this drama: "the state frequently does not even act indepen-
dently of large economic groups, but rather serves as a tool in their
struggles with one another.... Major economic interests in Russia thus
still use their access to national political power as a tool for capturing
desirable assets."
16 7
These attitudinal, behavioral, and institutional failures of a rule-of-
law state have a palpable effect on the consolidation of democracy. A
legislature that looks no farther than its own positive procedures for
the legitimacy of law is unlikely to present significant opposition to the
other branches of government. When a party of power sits as a
legislative majority, the combined effect can pave the way for rule
through the tool of law, rather than the security of rule of law. Similarly,
164. Kathryn Hendley, EnforcingJudgrnents in Russia's Economic Courts, 20 POST-SOvIET AFF. 1,
61-62 (2004).
165. Id.
166. Andrew Barnes, Russia's New Business Groups and State Power, 19 POST-SovIET AFF. 160
(2003).
167. Id. at 178-79.
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the civil society forced to grow in such an environment is unlikely to
appreciate the relationships between state and society that a causeway
application of law promotes. Economic society, of course, is particularly
acutely affected, as Anders Aslund observed:
To be a big businessman in Russia requires [having] at least one
representative in the State Duma, one in the Federation Coun-
cil, and close links with regional governors, which means that
every big businessman must be involved in politics, and thus be
liable to legal persecution by the president. The persistent
question is: Who is next?168
If that is the question on the minds of the oligarchs, what fears stir in
the hearts of the medium or small-sized businessman, let alone the
itinerant trader or desperate pensioner?
The Yukos affair encapsulates everything that the rule of law as a
causeway opposes. The affair began long before Khodorkovsky's arrest
at gunpoint in October 2003. In July 2000, Putin assembled twenty
leading oligarchs in the Kremlin to deliver a simple message: stay out of
politics and you may keep your assets. 1 69 This warning paralleled the
limitations of the old Soviet civil codes and constitutions, which made
"[t] he exercise of rights and freedoms.., inseparable from the perfor-
mance by a citizen of his duties" (Art. 59, 1977 Constitution) and
protected private rights "except as they are exercised in contradiction
to their social and economic purpose" (Section 1, 1922 Civil Code). 70
Gusinsky and Berezovsky were examples for Putin of oligarchs whose
actions made their rights and freedoms subject to revocation. Potanin,
Vekselberg, and other oligarchs who went out of their way to demon-
strate their willingness to abide by the crude deal Putin presented them
likewise demonstrated that they would not use their wealth in contradic-
tion to the social and economic purposes that Putin prescribed. The
constant threat that the government would revisit the legitimacy of
property acquired through privatization hung over the heads of oli-
168. Julie A. Corwin, Putin to Renew Dialogue with Big Business, RFE/RL RUSSIAN POL. WEEKLY,
May 13, 2004, http://www.rferl.org/reports/rpw/2004/05/18-130504.asp.
169. Taming the Robber Barons, ECONOMIST, May 22, 2004, at 5.
170. By contrast, the 1995 RF Civil Code, like the civil codes of other countries, limits civil law
rights only as necessary to protect the usual trio of health, welfare and morals. Beyond these
narrow prohibitions, the first article of the first part of the civil code makes clear that citizens and
juridical persons "effectuate their civil rights by their own will and in their own interest."
Grazhdanskii Kodeks RF [GK] [Civil Code] art. 1 (Russ.).
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garchs and less well-financed entrepreneurs alike. 171 Although some-
times couched as an offer of amnesty, this was nothing more than a
threat of retroactivity. v2 This is in stark contrast to the guiding prin-
ciples set forth in Russia's civil code, the commercial law of all Western
democracies, and inherent in the causeway of the rule of law: individu-
als are entitled to utilize their civil rights at their own discretion,
essentially unobstructed by the preferences of the state.
The prime example of this practice is the Yukos affair that culimi-
nated in criminal charges against Lebedev and Khodorkovsky of fraud,
tax evasion, and misappropriations stemming from privatization deals
in the early 1990s and a civil suit by the state for back taxes against
Yukos. The privatization laws through which Khodorkovsky made his
fortune and acquired the company - and that ultimately led to his
arrest - are testaments to the opacity, confusion, and secrecy that are
inimical to the rule of law. There was no causeway for Khodorkovsky
and others to walk along during privatization. This principle translated
into the primary argument Khodorkovsky's lawyers mounted in his
defense: the charged conduct was not illegal at the time it occurred.
173
To the extent that the Yukos affair has turned on privatization deals
that, however shady and unfair, were not proscribed by law at the time
they were taken, those prosecutions have been in clear violation of this
principle of the rule of law. The guilty verdicts and nine-year sentences
for each defendant were largely viewed therefore as an example of the
use of law as a tool to effectuate political goals.17 4 So stark has this
171. See Marshall Goldman, The Economy of Russia, in TimothyJ. Colton, Marshall Goldman,
Carol R. Saivetz, & Roman Szporluk, Russia in the Year 2004, 21 POST-SOVIET AFFAIRS 1, 9-10 (2005).
172. Jeremy Page, Russia Hints at Eventual Amnesty for Oligarchs, TIMES (UK), Apr. 19, 2004 at
21.
173. As Genrikh Padva, one of Khordokovsky's lead attorneys, summarized after the verdict
was announced, "The event did happen but it was not a crime, at least according to the legislation
of the time." Editorial, No Decision On Reversing Khodorkovsky Judgment Due Until September, RIA
NOVoSTI,June 1, 2005.
174. As Nikolai Petrov commented, "You can state the Kremlin's aim in a decent and proper
way. But the methods employed for this - the methods of a lawless state, not the rule of law but the
use of law - have automatically undermined the goal that the Kremlin set out for itself." Steve
Gutterman, Khodorkovsky Trial Shapes Putin's Legacy, AssociATED PRESS, June 1, 2005, available at
http://www.comcast.net/news/international/europe/index.jsp?cat=EUROPE&fn=/2005/06/
01/145537.html; see also Editorial, Kremlin's Win Is Russia's Loss, Moscow TIMES, June 1, 2005,
http://web.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2005/06/01/005.html ("Any remaining illusions that
this trial had anything to do with the rule of law were swept away. What we were left with, after a
year of testimony and volumes of documents, was a clear picture of ajudiciary functioning as a tool
of the state. Instead of the rule of law, we have the arbitrary use of law."); Editorial, A Soviet Show
Tria4 TIMES (UK), June 1, 2005 ("Mr Putin's insistence that business interests should not be
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violation been that one of Putin's chief economic advisors saw "evi-
dence that today the crossroads, where it would be possible to choose
which path to go down, is already behind us. We are already living in a
different country."' 75 Illarionov understood, at least implicitly, the
danger of retroactive legislation to the rule of law and to society: "When
the Yukos case began," he said, "everybody was asking which will be the
rules of the game. Now it is clear that there are no rules of the game."1 76
While Khodorkovsky remained in detention, the tax authorities
obtained from the Moscow City Arbitration Court an order freezing
Yukos assets in anticipation of the payment of back taxes and fines
assessed for the use of tax loopholes (now closed) that were legal at the
time they were employed.1 77 This demand for injunctive relief to
secure assets that few believed were reasonably in danger of flight was
widely viewed as a shot across the bow, if not an attempt to drive the
company into bankruptcy, and then reversion to state-friendly receiv-
ers.1 78 That is precisely what happened: in December 2004, Yugansk-
neftegaz, Yukos' prime production unit, was forced onto the auction
block and purchased by a front company for the state's interests in a
move widely seen as its renationalization.
Khodorkovsky's conviction in May 2005 was presaged by President
Putin's warning to the oligarchs back inJuly 2000. Since then, Putin has
been unambiguous in his belief that political discretion is a quid pro quo
for the exercise of civil rights in Russia. His recent restatement of his
view that it is the "law-abiding" citizen who is entitled to reliable legal
allowed to buy political influence - as happened so blatantly in the Yeltsin years - is defensible; yet
his use of the law to emasculate political opposition and intimidate challengers is a harking back
to Soviet thinking.").
175. Irina Granik & Nikolai Vardul, God velikogo obloma, KoMMERSANT, Dec. 29, 2004 http://
www.kommersant.ru/doc.html?docld=537109.
176. David Holley & Sergei L. Loiko, A Top Advisor to Putin Calls Oil Takeover the 'Scam of the
Year', LA.TIMEs, Dec. 29, 2004, at A4.
177. Gregory L. White & Guy Chazan, Yukos is Further Squeezed by Ban: Russian Court Bars Sales
of Assets, As Authorities Seek Back Taxes and Fines, WALL ST. J., Apr. 19, 2004, at A8.
178. See, e.g., the analysis of the April 15th Order by Peter Clateman, May 12, 2004,
http:www.cdi.org/Russia/Johnson/Yukos-orderO4O5l 1.pdf ("If this Order stands it would tend to
indicate that the courts are colluding with the tax authorities in attempting not only to collect
taxes, but to punish Yukos without a legitimate legal basis. The Order would then appear to be a
logical step in a plan, as some have speculated, to force Yukos into bankruptcy and then, through a
'controlled' bankruptcy, cause Yukos to be liquidated (despite the fact that it is clearly a going
concern) and the bulk of its assets to be transferred to the state at discounted prices. In other
words, the tax authorities, working with the prosecutor and the courts, would dismantle Yukos
using one of the primary shady tactics of the corporate battles of the 1990s, which have themselves
been sharply criticized by the presidential administration.").
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guarantees and state protection has been underlined by the state's
prosecution of those considered not to have abided by Putin's unwrit-
ten but universally understood laws of state authority. Putin is following
a long line of Russian rulers who used the law as a tool. New is Putin's
insistence, insufficiently scrutinized by political scientists, that this
approach is consonant with the rule of law.
V. CONCLUSION: A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR THE RULE OF LAW AS CAUSEWAY
Nationwide surveys conducted in 1996, 1998, and 2000 to measure
mass attitudes towards the rule of law revealed generally strong, albeit
abstract, support for rule-of-law principles, at levels roughly compa-
rable to those expressed by citizens in Western European countries.
179
But asked to apply those ideals to their own circumstances, a 2004
nationwide survey found that "[a] n overwhelming majority of Russians
do not think that they live under a rule-of-law state."18
The importance of the rule of law, apparent to Russian citizens asked
to participate in these polls, has been understudied by political scien-
tists and area studies specialists since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Ironically, disinterest in the details of the rule of law does not reflect
the importance almost universally attributed by comparative political
scientists to that component of a consolidated democracy. But, until
recently, experts on Russia have rarely found the study of Russian law to
be a fecund area of inquiry, and political science developed as a
discipline with a felt need to distinguish its work from legal studies. As a
result, analysts have been surprised by the difficulties experienced in
Russia with the rule of law - both in its operation and in its failure to
operate. "Privatize, privatize, privatize," was the mantra of Milton
Friedman and many others in the early 1990s. "But I was wrong," he
conceded. "It turns out that the rule of law is probably more basic than
privatization." 18 ' How startling to consider that even this mea culpa is
tinged with probability and hints of lingering doubt.
The rule of law, like electoral politics, civil society, or a functioning state
bureaucracy, is essential to a consolidated democracy. The study of that
variable should be no less rigorous or expansive than the study that has
benefited our understanding of those other institutions. Much valuable
work has already been done. Kathryn Hendley and Stephen Holmes have
179. James L. Gibson, Russian Attitudes Towards the Rule of Law: An Analysis of Survey Data, in
LAW AND INFORMAL PRACTICES, supra note 20, at 77, 88.
180. Rose, et al., supra note 3, at 200.
181. Quoted in Fukuyama, supra note 13.
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each written about the prerequisites to the emergence of the rule of law in
society. 182 Hendley has also demonstrated both the feasibility and utility of
extensive field research to test hypotheses about the rule of law in Russia
and seek the answers to questions as fundamental as they are simple and
direct, such as "Is going to court a waste of time for Russian firms?"
1 83
This Article has explored several facets of the rule of law both as
theoretical principles and as empirically found (or, more frequently,
found wanting) in Russian political history. In imperial, Soviet, and
post-Soviet history, law has always been used primarily as a tool by the
state. At its best, Russia has been able to establish only rule by or through
laws, and then only for short periods of time. Such a Rechtsstaat is
insufficient for the rule of law and it is an inadequate foundation to
accept for the consolidation of democracy. That understanding of the
rule of law implicitly accepts the use of law as a tool, so long as
formalistic and positivist criteria for the law's adoption are satisfied.
Law as a tool or weapon is not the only metaphor available, and in
many ways it is the worst one for a struggling democracy. The rule of
law also can be viewed as a causeway. In an imperfect world, in which
reform is piecemeal, partial, and expensive, that metaphor is far better
for conceptualizing the sort of rule of law that is most important for
Russia to realize its self-professed goals as an emerging democracy. It
emphasizes the essentials of a new form of relationship between state
and society from the hierarchical system of Russia's authoritarian past.
It establishes ground rules of the game not just for electoral politics,
but for the daily transactions and commercial necessities of individuals
and entrepreneurs. It promotes civil and economic societies in which
citizens can be secure in their knowledge of which activities are licit and
which are prohibited. And it sets certain standards for law beyond its
adoption by a majority in parliament.
Political scientists are well-equipped to analyze the degree to which
Russia conforms to these principles and practices. That study should focus
on how the rule of law builds a legal causeway for citizens and the
multitude of obstructions that can be placed on that road by the state. As a
Moscow defense attorney characterized the legal environment in which he
182. See Hendley, supra note 23 at 181 ("The argument is that law will come to matter when
society demands it and that the single most important factor in generating that demand is the rise
of market-based economic activity."). Similarly, Stephen Holmes has hypothesized that two
conditions must simultaneously be present for the rule of law to emerge: "[Wlhen the political
ruler has a good reason to make his own behavior predictable and when profit seekers start asking
for rules." Holmes in Maravall & Przeworski, supra, note 11 at 45.
183. Hendley, supra note 164 at 61-62.
[Vol. 37
RULE OF LAW IN RUSSIA
worked: "Sometimes the law reminds me of a rope strung across the road.
High-ranking officials, or those with a lot of money, can just step over it.
Petty criminals can crawl under it. Only common citizens are caught by
this rope."
18 4
Thomas More happens to be the patron saint of lawyers. And
although the real Thomas More's religious politics are, of course,
ill-suited to our time, the metaphor that Bolt placed in his mouth of the
rule of law as a causeway should be a guide for political scientists
interested in the consolidation of Russian democracy.
184. Birch, supra note 161.
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